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APPLYING THE PENNSYLVANIA 
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 
MEANINGFULLY TO CLIMATE DISRUPTION 
Robert B. McKinstry, Jr.∗ and John C. Dernbach** 
ABSTRACT 
 The Pennsylvania Constitution contains a unique Environmental Rights 
Amendment (ERA), which recognizes an individual right to “clean air, pure water, and 
to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.” 
The ERA also includes a public trust element that makes “Pennsylvania’s public natural 
resources . . . the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come.” It 
makes the Commonwealth the “trustee of these resources,” requiring it to “conserve and 
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.” Recent decisions by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court (the Court) in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth and 
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth provide 
significant support for Pennsylvania regulations to address the threat of climate disruption 
posed by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to achieve net zero carbon emissions by the 
middle of this century. 
 In light of the threats that climate disruption poses to Pennsylvania’s public natural 
resources, the text of the ERA, and the principles articulated in those recent cases, we 
argue that a stable climate (a climate that has not been disrupted by anthropogenic 
emissions of GHGs) should be considered protected by the rights recognized by the ERA, 
and the public trust duties it creates. We argue that these rights and duties require 
Pennsylvania to employ regulatory measures to reduce GHG emissions to the level 
warranted by the social cost of carbon and to achieve carbon neutrality (net zero 
emissions) by mid-century. Further, we argue that there are judicially recognizable 
standards to compel the Commonwealth to exercise its existing authority to limit GHG 
emissions. In light of existing legislative authority, the obligations imposed by the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, and the 
federal Clean Air Act, we make the case that this regulatory program should take the form 
of an economy-wide cap-and-trade program providing for the auction of allowances with 
a reserve price based on the social cost of carbon and additional measures to prevent 
leakage and a cap reaching carbon neutrality by mid-century. 
 ∗ Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. is the principal of Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. Environmental and 
Climate Law and Consulting. He can be reached at robert.mckinstry@gmail.com or bob-
by@robertbmckinstryjr.com. 
 ** John C. Dernbach is Commonwealth Professor of Environmental Law and Sustainability at 
Widener University, Commonwealth Law School, and Director of its Environmental Law and Sustain-
ability Center. He can be reached at jcdernbach@widener.edu. Thanks to Nathan Berry, Widener Uni-
versity Commonwealth Law School, Class of 2018, for research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1971, Pennsylvania voters overwhelmingly approved a nationally unique 
Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Pennsylvania Constitution, cre-
ating an individual right for all Pennsylvanians to “clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environ-
ment.”1 The ERA further made “Pennsylvania’s public natural resources . . . the 
common property of all the people, including generations yet to come,”2 and made 
the Commonwealth the “trustee of these resources,”3 requiring it to “conserve and 
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”4 Despite the ERA’s strong and 
clear language, for nearly half a century Pennsylvania courts left the provision 
toothless, substituting a three-part balancing test for the text of the ERA—a test 
completely divorced from the text that required little more than compliance with 
existing laws, and under which environmental advocates almost never won.5 In 
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth (Robinson Township) and Pennsylvania Envi-
ronmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth (PEDF), the Court dramatically re-
versed this approach, for the first time striking down acts of the General Assembly 
that it found to violate the ERA.6 In the PEDF case, the Court expressly rejected 
 1. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See infra note 24 and accompanying text; Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1973), aff’d 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976). 
The test bore no significant relationship to the text of Section 27.  John C. Dernbach, Taking the 
Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part II: Environmental Rights and Pub-
lic Trust, 104 DICK. L. REV. 97, 136-42 (1999). See John C. Dernbach & Marc Prokopchak, Recognition of 
Environmental Rights for Pennsylvania Citizens: A Tribute to Chief Justice Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 335, 
338-51 (2015); see infra discussion note 25. 
 6. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 969 (Pa. 2013) (plurality); Pa. Envtl. 
Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 930-36 (Pa. 2017).  
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the three-part balancing test, and held that the text of the ERA itself should be the 
primary basis for interpreting and applying it.7 These decisions also confirmed that 
the ERA created enforceable individual rights to environmental protection and 
that the Commonwealth had a judicially enforceable duty as a trustee to protect 
those rights and to conserve the corpus of the environmental trust.8 
The PEDF decision, in particular, provides significant support for meaningful-
ly pricing GHG emissions based on the social costs of GHG-caused climate dis-
ruption. In PEDF, the Court held that the Commonwealth’s duty as a trustee un-
der Article I, § 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution governs the disposition of 
natural gas lease revenues from state forest and park lands. It therefore struck 
down acts of the General Assembly that it found inconsistent with that duty. That 
legislation transferred monies received from gas leasing of state lands—which the 
Court held to represent “capital” or the corpus of the constitutional trust—into the 
General Fund, where it could be spent for purposes other than the conservation 
and maintenance of public natural resources. 
Because climate disruption poses an existential threat to all of Pennsylvania’s 
environmental trust resources, the logic of the PEDF decision leads to the conclu-
sion that the ERA creates a duty for the Commonwealth to address climate disrup-
tion caused by GHG emissions. That conclusion, coupled with existing legislative 
authority, supports arguments for putting a meaningful price on those emissions, 
commensurate with the social cost of carbon. The PEDF decision also calls into 
question the General Assembly’s ability to block regulations implementing pro-
grams for the protection of trust resources, including regulations addressing cli-
mate disruption.9 The decision’s implications regarding use of revenues from al-
lowances or fees on GHG emissions are less clear. The better arguments would 
allow all or substantial portions of the revenues to be used for the General Fund, as 
long as the revenues derive from actions that preserve, rather than deplete, the 
corpus of the trust. 
Furthermore, the PEDF decision and its application to climate disruption will 
likely have consequences beyond Pennsylvania’s borders because it provides a judi-
cially manageable approach to implementing an environmental constitutional 
amendment. Although more than a third of all state constitutions include provi-
sions regarding resource conservation and pollution, the provisions have tended to 
be more symbolic than legally meaningful, in no small part because courts have 
been unwilling or unable to find a way to enforce them.10 Moreover, many states 
apply a public trust doctrine similar to the standard incorporated into the Pennsyl-
 7. See generally PEDF, 161 A.3d 911 at 930-36. 
 8. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 969; PEDF, 161 A.3d 911 at 930-36. 
 9. See PEDF, 161 A.3d at 934-40. 
 10. Barton Thompson, Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Montana’s 
Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 158-9 (2003).  
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vania ERA,11 and a great many countries have environmental rights provisions in 
their constitutions.12 Because PEDF enforces an environmental rights provision 
and provides a judicially manageable standard for doing so, the decision will likely 
be influential in the many other states and countries with comparable provisions.13 
PEDF also can impact efforts elsewhere to use the public trust doctrine and 
environmental constitutional provisions to compel governments to reduce GHG 
pollution and prevent climate disruption. Some countries expressly address climate 
change in their constitutions, and a growing number of courts have found a right to 
climate justice in other provisions of their constitutions.14 Examples include both 
the Netherlands15 and at least one federal district court in the United States.16 In 
light of the hostility of the current U.S. administration to the issue of climate 
change, actions by the states to limit GHG emissions and to address the problem 
of climate disruption have become particularly significant. We argue that the anal-
ysis in PEDF matters for the states with constitutional environmental protection 
provisions or public trust obligations by showing how a constitutional environmen-
tal provision can support a petition for rulemaking to limit GHG emissions in or-
der to limit climate disruption, and also support a regulatory agency’s authority to 
subsequently adopt and implement such a rulemaking. 
Finally, PEDF is one in a series of cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has applied cogent historical and textual analysis to restore moribund state 
 11. See Barton Thompson, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction and Defense, 15 
SE. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 50-55 (2006). 
 12. JAMES R. MAY & ERIN DALY, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2015). 
 13. See John C. Dernbach, Kenneth T. Kristl, & James R. May, Pennsylvania Environmental 
Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Recognition of Environmental Rights for Pennsyl-
vania Citizens, RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 39), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3137074 (arguing that PEDF is a “formative case[]” which 
is likely to “shape shared conversation in the legal academy and elsewhere for generations to come”). 
 14. Id. at 39. 
 15. See Rechtbank Den Haag [Hague Court] 24 juni 2015, HA ZA 2015, 13-1396 m.nt. (Urgen-
da/State of the Netherlands) (Neth.) at 4.52 (holding that “a legal obligation of the State towards 
[Plaintiff] cannot be derived from Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution, . . . [but] these regulations still 
hold meaning, namely in the question . . . [of] whether the State has failed to meet its duty of care to-
wards [Plaintiff].”); Robert B. McKinstry Jr., Potential Implications for the United States of the Urgenda 
Foundation v. Netherlands Decision Holding that the UNFCCC and International Decisions Required Devel-
oped Nations to Reduce Emissions by 25 percent from 1990 Levels by 2020, CLIMATE CHANGE, 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., & ECOSYSTEMS COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER, July 2016, at 30, 31, https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/ccsde/201607_ccsde.
authcheckdam.pdf (noting that in the same case “[u]ltimately, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
standing to sue the state upon the Dutch state’s obligation to exercise ‘due care’ was based on Dutch 
constitutional law, the law of the EU, and international law.”). 
 16. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1241 (D. Or. 2017) (denying a motion to 
dismiss and holding that “[a]t its heart, this lawsuit asks this Court to determine whether defendants 
have violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. That question is squarely within the purview of the judici-
ary.”), mandamus denied sub nom., In re United States, 884 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2018), No. 17-71692.  
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constitutional provisions to affect their original intent.17  In that respect, the court 
is emerging as an intellectual leader among state high courts. 
In order best to explain the implications of the PEDF decision for climate dis-
ruption, we first discuss Article I, § 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Rob-
inson Township (Section I), and then analyze how Robinson Township was applied 
and extended in PEDF (Section II). Section III discusses the threats that climate 
disruption poses to Pennsylvania’s public natural resources. In light of those im-
pacts and the principles articulated in Robinson Township and PEDF, we make the 
case that a stable climate (a climate that has not been disrupted by anthropogenic 
emissions of GHGs) should be considered protected by the rights provided by the 
first clause of Article I, § 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and protected by 
the public trust duties created by the second and third clauses. We then make the 
case in Section IV that the Commonwealth’s duty to prevent climate disruption 
requires it to undertake measures to limit GHG emissions to the levels warranted 
by the social cost of carbon and to achieve carbon neutrality (net zero GHG emis-
sions) by mid-century. We also argue that there are judicially recognizable stand-
ards to compel the Commonwealth to exercise its existing legislative authority to 
do so. Section V discusses the elements of a regulatory structure that can mitigate 
climate disruption. We argue that this structure should take the form of an econo-
my-wide cap-and-trade program with allowances that are auctioned with a reserve 
price based on the social cost of carbon, accompanied by measures to prevent emis-
sions “leakage.” Section VI addresses issues relating to the prevention of leakage, 
distribution of allowances and the use of proceeds of an emissions auction. Finally, 
in Section VII we address limitations on the General Assembly’s power to block 
such a regulatory program. 
I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND  
ROBINSON TOWNSHIP 
The Environmental Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution18 
was approved in 1971 by the voters by a margin of nearly four to one.19 It contains 
 17. The jurisprudence extends beyond the Robinson Township and PEDF decisions giving mean-
ing to the original intent of Article I, § 27. In William Penn School District v. Pennsylvania Department of 
Education, 170 A.3d 414 (Pa. 2017) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a dismissal of claims and 
interpreted the Education Clause in Article III, § 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to give meaning 
to its guarantee of “a thorough and efficient system of public education” in light of that clause’s original 
intent. William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414 (Pa. 2017). In League of Women 
Voters v. Commonwealth, the Court interpreted the Free and Fair Elections Clause in Article I, § 5, of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution to give that clause its original meaning, invalidating the invidious prac-
tice of partisan gerrymandering. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 741 
(Pa. 2018). 
 18. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 19. Franklin L. Kury, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution: Twenty 
Years Later and Largely Untested, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 123 (1990).  
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three clauses. The first creates individual rights to environmental attributes.20 The 
second creates additional rights by making Pennsylvania’s public natural resources 
the property of all the people, including future generations.21 The third makes the 
Commonwealth, and its constituent units, trustees for the environment.22 Article I, 
§ 27 provides: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation 
of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. 
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all 
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these re-
sources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the 
benefit of all the people.23 
Shortly after the ERA was adopted, however, Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth 
Court devised a three-part balancing test as a substitute for the text of the ERA. 
That test provided: 
The court’s role must be to test the decision under review by a threefold 
standard: (1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and regu-
lations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth’s public natural 
resources? (2) Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce 
the environmental incursion to a minimum? (3) Does the environmental 
harm which will result from the challenged decision or action so clearly 
outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom that to proceed further 
would be an abuse of discretion?24 
The test bore no significant relationship to the text of Section 27, which speaks of 
enforceable constitutional rights and duties.25 Over the four decades when the test 
 20. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27, cl. 1. 
 21. Id. cl. 2 
 22. Id. cl. 3. 
 23. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 24. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976). 
 25. Dernbach, supra note 5 at 136-42. 
The test’s requirement for compliance with applicable statutes and regulations is meaningless with 
regards to a constitutional provision and certainly could not apply to actions challenging a statute on 
constitutional grounds. Although something like the second and third prongs of the test might conceiv-
ably be applied in some fashion where a court was balancing one constitutional right, such as a private 
party’s property right, against the constitutional right provided by the ERA in the context of a permit 
decision. But it is irrelevant to evaluation of the constitutionality of a statute or the government’s fail-
ure to exercise its duty as a trustee to conserve and maintain trust resources. 
Even in the context of a permitting decision, the test puts a heavy, and in cases, impossibly heavy 
burden on the party asserting its constitutional rights under the ERA to produce evidence that the re-
source has been impaired. In private trust law, a trustee’s duty is to gather and make available to the 
beneficiaries complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount of the trust property. Rob-
inson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 983, n.60 (Pa. 2013) (plurality); see also In re Rosenblum’s 
Estate, 459 Pa. 201, 328 A.2d 158, 164-65 (1974) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173)  
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was applied, parties invoking the ERA almost never prevailed.26 Until the Robinson 
Township decision in 2013, no court had used the ERA to hold a statute or regula-
tion unconstitutional.27 In that case, however, a plurality of the Court used the 
ERA for precisely that purpose. 
The legislation challenged in Robinson Township addressed the regulation of 
natural gas resources in the Commonwealth, particularly shale gas. The legislation 
superseded local governments’ control over land use, as well as those governments’ 
case-by-case consideration of the impacts of gas development on the natural envi-
ronment.28 Chief Justice Castille’s plurality opinion held that the legislative crea-
(right of access to trust records is essential part of beneficiary’s right to complete information concern-
ing administration of trust; right of inspection has independent source in beneficiary’s property interest 
in trust estate); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. c (“[B]eneficiary is always 
entitled to such information as is reasonably necessary to enable him to enforce his rights under the 
trust or to prevent or redress a breach of trust.”). This is consistent with § 83 of the RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS, which states “A trustee has a duty to maintain clear, complete, and accurate books 
and records regarding the trust property and the administration of the trust, and, at reasonable intervals 
on request, to provide beneficiaries with reports or accountings.” 
This disparate burden also violates the rule of impartiality, favoring the developer over the rights 
of the parties invoking the ERA. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (“When there are two or 
more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them”). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 79(1) (2005). This principle is illustrated in Estate of Sewell, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
found that the trustee had violated its fiduciary duty by benefiting one beneficiary at the expense of 
another. 487 Pa. 379, 383, 409 A.2d 401, 402 (1979) (holding against the trustee where they failed to 
confirm the existence of an additional beneficiary while continuing to give all benefits to the known 
beneficiary). 
 26. See John C. Dernbach & Marc Prokopchak, Recognition of Environmental Rights for Pennsylva-
nia Citizens: A Tribute to Chief Justice Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 335, 344-51 (2015). 
 27. See id. (explaining that the ERA was invoked to challenge decisions by state agencies and 
local governments, but not identifying any cases in which the ERA was invoked to challenge the consti-
tutionality of a statute). 
 28. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979. 
The statute’s new regulatory regime permitting industrial uses as a matter of right in every type 
of pre-existing zoning district is incapable of conserving or maintaining the constitutionally-protected 
aspects of the public environment and of a certain quality of life. In Pennsylvania, terrain and natural 
conditions frequently differ throughout a municipality, and from municipality to municipality. As a 
result, the impact on the quality, quantity, and well-being of our natural resources cannot reasonably be 
assessed on the basis of a statewide average. Protection of environmental values, in this respect, is a 
quintessential local issue that must be tailored to local conditions. 
Section 3215(d) marginalizes participation by residents, business owners, and their elected 
representatives with environmental and habitability concerns, whose interests Section 3215 
ostensibly protects. See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3202 (2011) (Declaration of purpose of chap-
ter). The result is that Section 3215 fosters decisions regarding the environment and habita-
bility that are non-responsive to local concerns; and, as with the uniformity requirement of 
Section 3304, the effect of failing to account for local conditions causes a disparate impact 
upon beneficiaries of the trust. Moreover, insofar as the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection is not required, but is merely permitted, to account for local concerns in its permit 
decisions, Section 3215(d) fails to ensure that any disparate effects are attenuated. Again, in- 
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tion of uniform rules interfered with the municipalities’ duties as trustees under 
Article I, § 27, and that the rules were therefore unconstitutional.29 
The plurality in Robinson Township based its construction of the ERA primari-
ly on the plain language of the provision and its legislative history.30 It found that 
its construction was supported by consideration of “the occasion and necessity for 
the constitutional provision, . . . the circumstances of enactment and ratification, 
the mischief to be remedied and the object to be attained.”31 The plurality dis-
cussed at length Pennsylvania’s long history of environmental abuse in connection 
with coal mining, deforestation, pollution, and wildlife eradication.32 These abuses 
provided the impetus for the ERA’s adoption.33 The opinion noted that the chal-
lenged law was written to encourage a gas extraction boom that posed the risk of 
causing similar environmental degradation.34 In striking down the portions of the 
law that limited the power of local governments and state agencies to exercise their 
obligation as trustees to prevent degradation, diminution, and depletion of consti-
tutionally protected natural resources, the plurality opinion articulated the follow-
ing key legal principles: 
• The rights provided by the first and second clauses of the ERA rep-
resent fundamental, individual rights akin to free speech, freedom of 
religion and other rights enumerated in Article I of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, and they should be interpreted as such.35 
• The first clause “affirms a limitation on the state’s power to act con-
trary” to the people’s right to “clean air, pure water, and the preser-
vation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the envi-
ronment.” As a result, “laws of the Commonwealth that 
unreasonably impair the right are unconstitutional.”36 
equitable treatment of trust beneficiaries is irreconcilable with the trustee duty of impartiali-
ty. 
Id. at 984. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 950-959.  For a complete legislative history, see John C. 
Dernbach & Edmund J. Sonnenberg, A Legislative History of Article 1, Section 27 of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Showing Source Documents (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474660. A companion version that does not show photocopies of pages of 
source documents is John C. Dernbach & Edmund J. Sonnenberg, Legislative History: Article 1, Section 27 
of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 24 WIDENER L.J. 181 (2015). 
 31. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 960. 
 32. Id. at 960-963. 
 33. Id. at 961 (“With these events in the recent collective memory of the General Assembly, the 
proposed Environmental Rights Amendment received the unanimous assent of both chambers during 
both the 1969–1970 and 1971–1972 legislative sessions.”). 
 34. Id. at 976. 
 35. Id. at 953-54, 976. 
 36. Id. at 951.  
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• “The drafters seemingly signaled an intent that the concept of public 
natural resources would be flexible to capture the full array of re-
sources implicating the public interest, as these may be defined by 
statute or at common law.”37 
• The public natural resources that are made the property of all the 
people by the second clause and the subject of the Commonwealth’s 
duty as a trustee include “not only state-owned lands, waterways, and 
mineral reserves, but also resources that implicate the public interest, 
such as ambient air, surface and ground water, wild flora, and fauna 
(including fish) that are outside the scope of purely private proper-
ty.”38 The constitutional rights created by the second clause of the 
ERA include the right to enforce the duty of a trustee created by the 
third clause.39 
• The public trust provisions of the ERA are self-executing, as they 
create constitutional duties that bind all three branches of state gov-
ernment, and they can be applied and enforced by the judicial branch 
without further legislative action.40 
• The Commonwealth’s duties as a trustee should be governed by the 
established law applicable to trusts and trustees, including the legal 
principles articulated in the Restatement of Trusts.41 These trustee 
duties include prudence (“exercise[ing] ordinary skill, prudence and 
caution in managing corpus of trust”), loyalty (administering the 
trust “solely in beneficiary’s” interest), and impartiality (“treat[ing] 
all [beneficiaries] equitably in light of the purposes of the trust”).42 
The plurality opinion, however, received votes from only three of the Court’s 
seven justices.43 Justice Baer supported the plurality’s decision on a separate ba-
sis—substantive due process.44 While the Robinson Township decision sketched a 
view of what Article I, § 27 could ultimately mean, it did not enshrine these prin-
ciples as law. 
 37. Id. at 955. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 955-56. 
The third clause of Section 27 establishes the Commonwealth’s duties with respect to 
Pennsylvania’s commonly-owned public natural resources, which are both negative (i.e., prohibito-
ry) and affirmative (i.e., implicating enactment of legislation and regulations). The provision es-
tablishes the public trust doctrine with respect to these natural resources (the corpus of the trust) 
and designates ‘the Commonwealth’ as trustee and the people as the named beneficiaries. 
 40. See id. at 966-67. 
 41. Id. at 955-57. 
 42. Id. at 957, 959. 
 43. Id. at 1000. 
 44. Id. at 1000-1001.  
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II. THE DECISION IN PEDF 
In PEDF, the Court reaffirmed the Robinson Township principles and made 
them the applicable law of Article I, § 27. The plaintiff in PEDF challenged a se-
ries of legislative enactments that eliminated requirements that revenues from gas 
development leases on state forest and park lands be used for conservation purpos-
es; these enactments transferred oil and gas leasing revenues to the general fund.45 
The challenged legislation thus significantly changed the disposition of revenues 
dedicated to the Oil and Gas Lease Fund, administered by the Department of 
Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR).46 The Fund was created by a 1955 
Act47 requiring “[a]ll rents and royalties from oil and gas leases of any” Common-
wealth land to be deposited in the fund and  “exclusively used for conservation, 
recreation, dams, or flood control.”48 The challenged legislation transferred much 
of the money that would have been deposited in the Lease Fund to the General 
Fund, where it could be used for any purpose authorized by the General Assem-
bly.49 The challenged legislation also created a cap on revenues committed to 
DCNR under the Lease Fund, rather than requiring all moneys received from gas 
leasing to be used for conservation and maintenance of environmental trust re-
sources.50 
The plaintiff challenged these enactments in Commonwealth Court as viola-
tive of the public trust clauses of Article I, § 27.51 The Commonwealth Court 
granted summary judgment to the Commonwealth, holding that there was no vio-
lation of the constitutional public trust.52 In reversing the Commonwealth Court, a 
majority of the Court reaffirmed the breadth of the Robinson Township decision and 
 45. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916, 921-25 (Pa. 2017). 
Three legislative amendments to the state fiscal code between 2008 and 2014 redirected a total of 
$335 million that would have been used for conservation purposes under the [Lease Fund Act] to 
the general fund, where it is appropriated for a variety of state government purposes. In addition, 
the Legislature prevented DCNR from spending any [Lease Fund Act] royalties without prior 
legislative authorization. Finally, the Legislature began using [Lease Fund] revenue to support 
the overall budget of DCNR, rather than obtaining that budget money from the general fund and 
using [Lease Fund] money for conservation purposes related to oil and gas extraction. 
Id. (citing John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 463, 
488 (2015) (internal citations omitted)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Oil and Gas Lease Fund Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1331 (2017). 
 48. Id. 
 49. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 921-24. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 925-26, 928 
 52. Id. at 928.  
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Article I, § 27 rights and duties, and it quoted extensively from Robinson Town-
ship.53 The Court held: 
Because state parks and forests, including the oil and gas minerals therein, 
are part of the corpus of Pennsylvania’s environmental public trust, we 
hold that the Commonwealth, as trustee, must manage them according to 
the plain language of Section 27, which imposes fiduciary duties con-
sistent with Pennsylvania trust law. We further find that the constitu-
tional language controls how the Commonwealth may dispose of any pro-
ceeds generated from the sale of its public natural resources.54 
The Court’s recitation of the facts suggests that the Court viewed the General 
Assembly’s actions as looting a fund (the Lease Fund) dedicated to conservation of 
state forests and parks in order to fund a budget deficit in a way that would inter-
fere with maintenance of those lands.55 The Court found this change significant 
because “DCNR had anticipated receiving the full amount of the rents and royal-
ties to allow it to oversee the rapid expansion of drilling on state land when it de-
cided to enter into the 2008 Leases.”56 The legislation further restricted the envi-
ronmental purposes for which the now-limited revenues going into the Lease Fund 
could be used.57 The Court characterized the challenged actions as “transfers of 
capital.”58 
The portions of the opinion of greatest significance for regulation of GHGs 
relate to the standard of review under Article I, § 27 and the contours of the 
ERA.59 The Court began by rejecting outright the three-part balancing test that 
had been used as a substitute for the text of the ERA, saying that the test “strips 
the constitutional provision of its meaning.”60 The Court then stated that the first 
two clauses of the ERA created rights that were “excepted out of the general pow-
ers of government” and that those rights, like all other rights articulated in Article 
 53. Id. at 916-921 (quoting Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 960-63 (Pa. 2013) 
(plurality)), 929-933, 936, 938. 
 54. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 916. 
 55. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 955-56 (Pa. 2013) (plurality). 
The third clause of Section 27 establishes the Commonwealth’s duties with respect to Pennsylva-
nia’s commonly-owned public natural resources, which are both negative (i.e., prohibitory) and affirma-
tive (i.e., implicating enactment of legislation and regulations). The provision establishes the public 
trust doctrine with respect to these natural resources (the corpus of the trust) and designates ‘the Com-
monwealth’ as trustee and the people as the named beneficiaries. 
Id. 
 56. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 922. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 924. 
 59. Id. at 930-36. 
 60. Id. at 930.  
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I of the Pennsylvania Constitution, “shall forever remain inviolate.”61 It noted that 
the “public natural resources”62 that were made the property of the people included 
both the state forest and park lands and “the oil and gas themselves.”63 The Court 
explained that the original draft of the second sentence of the ERA provided that 
the property of the people (including future generations) extended to “‘Pennsylva-
nia’s natural resources, including the air, waters, fish, wildlife, and the public lands 
and property of the Commonwealth. . . .’ The Court further explained that this 
language was revised to remove the enumerated list and thereby discourage courts 
from limiting the scope of natural resources covered.” Because there was no stated 
problem with the list of natural resources contained in the original draft, the list in 
the original draft of the second sentence represents a minimum list of the public 
natural resources protected by the ERA.64 The items on this list are therefore the 
property of all the people.65 
The Court then elaborated on the trustee duties created by the third clause of 
the ERA, adopting the Robinson Township interpretation of that clause as imposing 
upon the Commonwealth a fiduciary duty equivalent to that imposed upon trustees 
by existing trust law, with that duty extending to the public, including future gen-
erations.66 The Court discussed the applicable duties imposed on trustees as set 
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, noting that these duties include the 
requirement that a trustee “manage the trust so as to give all of the beneficiaries 
due regard for their respective interests in light of the purposes of the trust.”67 The 
Court summarized the duties created by Article I, § 27, as follows: 
Pennsylvania’s environmental trust thus imposes two basic duties on the 
Commonwealth as the trustee. First, the Commonwealth has a duty to 
prohibit the degradation, diminution, and depletion of our public natural 
resources, whether these harms might result from direct state action or 
from the actions of private parties. Second, the Commonwealth must act 
affirmatively via legislative action to protect the environment. Although a 
trustee is empowered to exercise discretion with respect to the proper 
 61. Id. at 930-31 (quoting Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 948 (Pa. 2013) (plu-
rality), quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 25). 
 62. Id. at 931. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (citing PA. LEGIS. JOURNAL, 154th General Assembly, No. 118, Reg. Sess., 2274 (1970) 
(Broughton Analysis)). In a footnote, the Court explained that the word “public” was added to modify 
“natural resources” to indicate that the public’s rights and the trust obligations did not extend to “purely 
private property rights.” The Court also noted that the ERA’s author and principal advocate opined 
that that this limitation did not apply to resources, such as those originally enumerated, that “involve a 
public interest.” Id., n.22 (quoting PA. LEGIS. JOURNAL, 154th General Assembly, No. 118, Reg. Sess., 
2271-72 (1970) (statement by Rep. Kury)). 
 66. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 932 (Pa. 2017). 
 67. Id. at 933.  
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treatment of the corpus of the trust, that discretion is limited by the pur-
pose of the trust and the trustee’s fiduciary duties, and does not equate 
“to mere subjective judgment.” The trustee may use the assets of the trust 
“only for purposes authorized by the trust or necessary for the preserva-
tion of the trust; other uses are beyond the scope of the discretion con-
ferred, even where the trustee claims to be acting solely to advance other 
discrete interests of the beneficiaries.”68 
In a footnote, the Court expressly rejected the dissent’s contention that its holding 
would cordon off hundreds of millions of dollars for other budgetary uses, noting 
that this question was never raised and was not before the Court.69 
Consequently, the Court held that if the trustee was disposing of the assets of 
the trust, it was bound to use the proceeds in ways necessary and appropriate for 
carrying out the purposes of the trust, which in the case of the ERA was the 
maintenance and conservation of public natural resources.70 The Court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that “all revenues generated by oil and gas leases [needed to] 
remain in the corpus of the trust.”71 It held that the royalties arose from the sale of 
principal and were therefore in the trust.72 The Court said it was less clear how to 
categorize other revenue streams from gas leasing, and that additional advocacy 
was required to determine whether those revenues constituted principal or in-
come.73 
Reaffirming the plurality opinion in Robinson Township, the Court rejected an 
argument raised by the Republican Caucus of the General Assembly that the pub-
lic trust provisions of Article I, § 27 were not self-executing but instead required 
implementing legislation.74 It also reaffirmed the Robinson Township plurality opin-
ion “that the Commonwealth’s obligations as trustee ‘create a right in the people to 
seek to enforce the obligations.’”75 
Applying its explanation of Article I, § 27 to the legislation at issue, the Court 
concluded that in transferring royalties from a restricted fund to the unrestricted 
General Fund, the Commonwealth did not “contemplate, let alone reasonably ex-
ercise, its duties as the trustee of the environmental public trust created by the” 
ERA.76 The Court thus invalidated the provisions relating to the transfer of royal-
ties,77 which meant that the prior statutory dedication of the Lease Fund resources 
 68. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 69. Id. at n.25. 
 70. Id. at 933-35. 
 71. Id. at 935. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 935-36. 
 74. Id. at 936-37. 
 75. Id. at 937. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 937-38.  
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to DCNR applied.78 The Court emphasized that its holding did not require that 
the revenues constituting the corpus of the trust be included in the restricted fund 
or even be dedicated to DCNR, as long as the funds were used for the purpose of 
the trust, viz. “maintenance and conservation” of Article I, § 27 resources.79 The 
matter was remanded to the Commonwealth Court to make a determination with 
respect to other revenues.80 
III.  ARTICLE I, § 27 APPLIES TO CLIMATE DISRUPTION 
Climate disruption already adversely affects Pennsylvania, and these adverse 
effects will increase over time. The severity of future impacts depends to a great 
extent on what actions are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and even re-
move carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.81 Yet under Article I, §27, the people of 
the Commonwealth have a right to a natural climate that is not disrupted by exces-
sive concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere. In addition, the Commonwealth 
has a commensurate duty to limit emissions to prevent climate disruption. 
A. The Impact of Climate Disruption on Pennsylvania 
The existing and projected adverse effects of climate change on the nation and 
the world have been well documented and explained. Sources include the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency’s 2009 finding under the Clean Air Act that emis-
sions of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles may reasonably be expected to en-
danger public health and welfare, which was upheld on judicial review.82 They also 
include multiple reports of the U.S. Global Change Research Program, including 
its 2017 report;83 multiple reports of the National Research Council (NRC) of the 
 78. Id. at 939. 
 79. Id. at 939. 
 80. Id. 
 81. TIM FLANNERY, THE WEATHER MAKERS 167-202 (2005); RICHARD B. ALLEY, THE TWO 
-MILE TIME MACHINE 181-92 (2000), https://muse.jhu.edu/book/36460. 
 82. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 66,514 (Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter Endangerment Finding], aff’d Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Utility Air Regula-
tory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (UARG). 
 83. See, e.g., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL 
REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME I (2017), https://
science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf; see also John C. Dernbach & Rob-
ert Altenburg, Evolution of U.S. Climate Policy, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 84-87 
(Michael B. Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds. 2014) (explaining authorizing legislation for U.S. Global 
Change Research Program and describing some earlier reports).  
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National Academy of Sciences;84 the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change;85 numerous reports of other national academies of science;86 and 
even judicial decisions.87 
State-specific information also exists for Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania 
Climate Change Act requires the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) 
to produce a report every three years on the actual and projected impacts of cli-
mate change on the state.88 DEP’s 2015 report on the impacts of climate change in 
Pennsylvania89 makes clear that the effects of climate disruption on Pennsylvania’s 
public natural resources are likely to exceed the impacts of uncontrolled coal min-
ing, deforestation, and industrial development that motivated Section 27’s adop-
tion.  These historical effects are described in Robinson Township and PEDF at 
length.90 The 2015 Pennsylvania report explains that GHGs in the atmosphere are 
already reaching the point that will cause an increase in temperature from pre-
industrial levels, and their continued emissions will cause an increase much higher 
than 2°C above pre-industrial levels by mid-century.91 According to that report, 
“Pennsylvania has undergone a long-term warming of more than 1°C (1.8°F) over 
the past 110 years.”92 It also projects an increase of about 3°C (5.4°F) between 2000 
and 2050, which means that the “current warming trend is expected to continue at 
an accelerated rate.”93 As discussed below, it will be necessary to keep temperature 
increases well below 2°C and desirable to keep them below 1.5°C to prevent serious 
climate disruption.94 
 84. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE 
BASIS (2013), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE 
STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO 
MILLENNIA (2011), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/12877/climate-stabilization-targets-emissions-
concentrations-and-impacts-over-decades-to; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ABRUPT IMPACTS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE: ANTICIPATING SURPRISES (2013), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18373/abrupt-
impacts-of-climate-change-anticipating-surprises. 
 85. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 
(AR5) (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/index.shtml. 
 86. See, e.g., ROYAL SOCIETY, CLIMATE CHANGE: A SUMMARY OF THE SCIENCE (2010), 
https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/publications/2010/climate-change-summary-science/. 
 87. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc., 684 F.3d 102; see also Green Mt. Chrysler Plymouth 
Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 295, 307-310 (D. Vt. 2007). 
 88. Pennsylvania Climate Change Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1361.3 (2017). 
 89. JAMES SHORTLE, ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA CLIMATE IMPACTS ASSESSMENT UPDATE (May 
2015) [hereinafter PA CLIMATE IMPACTS]. The report was required by the Pennsylvania Climate 
Change Act, 71 Pa. C.S. § 1361.3. 
 90. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 960-63 (Pa. 2013) (plurality), quoted in Pa. 
Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916-21 (Pa. 2017). 
 91. See generally PA CLIMATE IMPACTS, supra note 89. 
 92. Id. at 6 (“Changes in Pennsylvania’s temperature are reflected in other metrics, such as heat-
ing degree days (which have increased) and cooling degree days (which have decreased).”). 
 93. Id. at 7. 
 94. See infra Section V.A.  
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This warming is, and will continue to be, accompanied by a parallel trend in 
increasing precipitation.95 “The corresponding annual precipitation increase is ex-
pected to be 8%, with a winter increase of 14%.”96 The report does not say—and 
could not say—that warming and precipitation trends will stabilize in 2050.97 
Climate change, the report says, will also increase air pollution and will likely 
make water pollution worse.  On air pollution, the report states: 
Climate change will worsen air quality relative to what it would otherwise 
be, causing increased respiratory and cardiac illness. The linkage between 
climate change and air quality is most strongly established for ground-
level ozone creation during summer, but there is some evidence that 
higher temperatures and higher precipitation will result in increased al-
lergen (pollen and mold) levels as well.98 
Climate change will also likely increase water pollution: 
Climate change can potentially also worsen water quality, affecting health 
through drinking water and through contact during outdoor recreation. 
The two primary mechanisms through which climate change could affect 
surface water quality are 1) increased pathogen loads due to increased sur-
face runoff from livestock farms, sewer overflows, and resuspension of 
pathogens in river sediments during heavy rainstorms, and 2) increased 
risk of harmful algal blooms in eutrophied lakes and reservoirs.99 
Although there may be some beneficial impacts from these changes, the Penn-
sylvania climate impacts report indicates that the adverse effects on Pennsylvania’s 
public natural resources will dwarf any positive impacts.100 Higher temperatures 
will stress the dairy industry and require increased energy use.101 It will also cause 
forest types to change, lead to increased mortality in the forests, and interfere with 
forest regeneration.102 Increased temperatures may increase the prevalence of vec-
tor-borne diseases.103 Climate change will have “a severe, negative impact on win-
ter recreation,” so that “Pennsylvania’s downhill ski and snowboard resorts are not 
expected to remain economically viable past mid-century.”104 Some areas will no 
 95. PA CLIMATE IMPACTS, supra note 89, at 6-7. 
 96. Id. at 7. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. at 11. 
 99. Id. at 11, 14. In addition, “climate change will worsen the currently substandard water quali-
ty in the tidal freshwater region of the Delaware Estuary.” Id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. at 8. 
 102. Id. at 9-10. 
 103. Id. at 11. 
 104. Id.  
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longer be able to support trout.105 Flood risks will increase throughout the Com-
monwealth.106 Moreover, sea level rise will affect the Delaware estuary, inundating 
some areas and causing an increase in salinity.107 
Reports published since 2015 have determined that the adverse impacts of 
climate disruption on public natural resources will be more severe than those iden-
tified in the Pennsylvania climate impacts report. One more recent report indicates 
that sea level rise due to melting glaciers will be more extensive, such that some 
parts of Tinicum National Wildlife Refuge and Philadelphia International Airport 
will be inundated before the end of the century.108 Another indicates that adverse 
impacts on plants and wildlife will be particularly severe, even with the emissions 
reductions that will be achieved under the current pledges in the Paris Agreement 
on climate change.109 That study concluded that with the current pledges, tempera-
tures would increase by approximated 3.2°C, reducing the ranges by more than 
50% for approximately 49% of insect species, 44% of plant species and 26% of ver-
tebrate species, and dramatically increasing their risk of extinction.110 With greater 
GHG emission reductions that would limit temperature increases to the Paris 
Agreement’s goals of 2°C and 1.5°C, the damage will be substantially less.111 These 
species, of course, include species in Pennsylvania. 
Nor will the impacts of climate disruption be evenly distributed. Low income 
and minority communities are likely to be more severely affected because of “lack 
of air conditioning, greater prevalence of pre-existing health conditions, location 
and condition of housing, inadequate access to transportation, relatively greater 
rates of under-insurance, and concentrations in strenuous occupations.”112 In addi-
 105. Id. at 12. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 14. 
 108. A study published in 2018 based on 25 years of satellite data showed accelerated rates of sea 
level rise driven by the melting of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and predicted that, if these 
rates continue, sea levels would rise by 65 centimeters, or 26 inches, by 2100 compared to past esti-
mates. R. S. Nerem et al., Climate-change–driven Accelerated Sea-Level Rise Detected in the Altimeter Era, 
115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2022, 2022 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1717312115. The last 
IPCC assessment estimated that sea levels could rise from between 44 cm and 74 cm by 2100, so that 
the 2018 study suggests that sea level rise will be approximately two times that estimate or 109 to 139 
cm, or approximately four feet. John A. Church et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Sea 
Level Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Chapter 13, at 1182, Table 
13.5 (2013), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/. Because Tinicum marsh and the airport are located in 
tidal areas of the Delaware Estuary, significant portions would be inundated. 
 109. R. Warren et al., The Projected Effects on Insects, Vertebrates, and Plants of Limiting Global 
Warming to 1.5°C Rather Than 2°C, 360 SCIENCE 791, 791 (2018). 
 110. Id. 
 111. At 2°C these numbers fall to 18% of insects, 16% of plants, and 26% of vertebrates, and at 
1.5⁰C they fall further to 6% of insects, 8% of plants, and 4% of vertebrates. Id. 
 112. Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 627-28 (2017) (citing IPCC 
and other studies).  
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tion, because climate change will likely increase the price of water, food, and even 
energy, it will also disproportionately affect households with lower incomes.113 
Three additional points need to be made about this information, and they all 
suggest that these impacts will be greater than indicated in the Pennsylvania re-
port, the EPA’s endangerment finding, and other reports. Most obviously, per-
haps, these analyses are mostly silent on impacts after 2050 or any other future 
date. There is no scientific reason to believe that warming will stabilize by those 
dates; indeed, in business-as-usual scenarios, warming continues after those 
dates.114 
Second, it is very likely that the impacts of climate disruption will increase 
over time, and that any damages occurring after 2050 will be far greater than those 
discussed in the Pennsylvania report and other sources. Yet many cost-benefit 
analyses discount costs to future generations, thus reducing these calculated future 
costs to an insignificant number.115 
Third, the damage estimates in the Pennsylvania assessment and other reports 
tend not to account for the possibility of catastrophic climate disruption. There are 
potentially significant risks of catastrophic results if GHG emissions are not re-
duced and eliminated in a sufficiently timely manner.116 The end Permian mass 
 113. Id. at 628-29. 
 114. Nebojsa Nakicenovic & Rob Swart, Emissions Scenarios, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/emission/index.php?idp=115, (last visited Apr. 
15, 2018); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 
SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 11 (2014). 
 115. Many ethicists question whether the cost of future climate disruption affecting future un-
born generations should be discounted at all. In one of the first assessments of the ethical implications 
of climate change, a group of ethicists noted: 
Proponents of discounting in CBA urge that the value of future environmental benefits be 
determined in the same way that the market applies value to future events—that is by un-
derstanding the present value of future benefits. When such discounting occurs, benefits 
from climate change policy options that will accrue far in the future are given little present 
value. Such an approach makes current investors’ interests, not future generations’ welfare, 
the focus of concern. 
DONALD BROWN ET AL., WHITE PAPER ON THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
29, (2006). These ethicists further concluded: 
Because discounting benefits in CBA assumes only contemporary investor-individuals’ in-
terests count in determining worth, discounting techniques in CBA can violate interests of 
future generations to have a global climate system that has not been degraded by human ac-
tivities. Since nations agreed in the adopting the UNFCCC to protect the interests of fu-
ture generations, discounting benefits and harms in CBAs can violate the duty of nations to 
keep promises made in treaties. 
Id. at 32. These concerns were more recently echoed by Pope Francis in his encyclical letter, which, 
without addressing discounting per se, condemned placing short term current interests ahead of the 
interest of future generations. See POPE FRANCIS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER, LAUDATO SI’ OF THE HOLY 
FATHER FRANCIS ON CARE FOR OUR COMMON HOME 1118-1120 (2015). 
 116. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 521-22 (2007)  
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extinction presents an extreme example of the potential high risk; 90% or more of 
all life on Earth died following a rapid (in geological terms) increase in carbon di-
oxide that occurred when volcanic action burned significant coal-bearing strata.117 
Most analyses of the social cost of carbon, which as discussed below measures the 
cost of the future damages caused by emitting a ton of carbon dioxide today, fail to 
account for the risk of catastrophic results. For climate disruption, the probabilistic 
curve plotting likelihood versus damage is unusual in that it has a very long tail, 
representing low probability catastrophic cost possibilities.118 In markets, the risk 
of such catastrophic events suggests that, rather than discounting, we should pay a 
premium to prevent them, just as we pay a premium for riskier stocks over safer 
bonds.119 A model incorporating consideration of risk of catastrophic results far less 
significant than the end Permian mass extinction has calculated that in 2015 carbon 
dioxide should have been priced or taxed at about $125 per ton.120 The same model 
shows that each year that action is delayed will increase damages by $700 billion 
per year “and a 15 year delay would cost roughly $180 trillion, about six times cur-
rent annual global consumption.”121 
According to the climate scientist Michael MacCracken, “qualified scientific experts in-
volved in climate change research” have reached a “strong consensus” that global warming 
threatens (among other things) a precipitate rise in sea levels by the end of the century, 
MacCracken Decl. ¶ 15, Stdg.App. 207, “severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosys-
tems,” id., ¶ 5(d), at 209, a “significant reduction in water storage in winter snowpack in 
mountainous regions with direct and important economic consequences,” id., and an increase 
in the spread of disease, id., ¶ 28, at 218-219. He also observes that rising ocean temperatures 
may contribute to the ferocity of hurricanes. Id., ¶¶ 23-25, at 216-217. 
Id. 
See, e.g., R. B. Alley et al., Abrupt Climate Change, 299 SCIENCE 2005, 2008 (2016); James Hansen, et 
al., Icemelt, Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: Evidence from Paleoclimate Data, Climate Modeling, and Modern 
Observations that 2⁰C Global Warming Could Be Dangerous, 16 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 
3761, 3762 (2016) [hereinafter Hansen et al, Ice Melt]; James Hansen et al., Global Temperature Change, 
103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.14288, 14292-93 (2006); T.M.L. Wigley, The Climate Change Commitment, 
307 SCIENCE 1766, 1767-68 (2005). 
 117. Raymond B. Huey & Peter D. Ward, Hypoxia, Global Warming and Terrestrial Late Permian 
Extinctions, 308 SCIENCE 398 (2005); FLANNERY, supra note 81 at 200-01; JAMES HANSEN, STORMS 
OF MY GRANDCHILDREN: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE COMING CLIMATE CATASTROPHE AND OUR 
LAST CHANCE TO SAVE HUMANITY 144-50 (2009) [hereinafter STORMS]. 
 118. See Matthew Collins et al., Long Term Climate Change: Projections, Commitments, and Irrevers-
ibility, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL REPORT ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 1029, 1114-19 (Sylvie Joussaume, Abdalah Mokssit, Karl Taylor, Simon Tett eds. 
2013). 
 119. JERRY TAYLOR, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX 13-15 (2015), http://
niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/The-Conservative-Case-for-a-Carbon-Tax1.pdf. 
 120. KENT D. DANIEL, ROBERT B. LITTERMAN, & GERNOT WAGNER, APPLYING ASSET 
PRICING THEORY TO CALIBRATE THE PRICE OF CLIMATE RISK 25 (2017) (revised draft), https://
gwagner.com/wp-content/uploads/DLW-Asset-Pricing-Climate-Risk-171113.pdf. 
 121. Id. at 41.  
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B. Both the First and Second Clauses of Article I, § 27 Extend to the Natural 
Climate Unaffected by Climate Disruption 
1.  Scope of Article I, § 27 
Although the climate is not expressly protected under the ERA, the ERA’s 
language and legislative history, as well as the reasoning of both Robinson Township 
and PEDF, all compel the conclusion that a climate free of human disruption is 
protected by Article I, § 27. 
The right to a natural climate unaffected by climate disruption is included 
within the ERA’s first clause, which protects the people of Pennsylvania’s right to 
“clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and 
esthetic values of the environment.”122 The Pennsylvania report indicates that a 
warming climate will adversely affect air quality, thus compromising the people’s 
right to clean air.123 The report also indicates that a warming climate will likely 
lead to greater water pollution, increased flooding, and sea level rise, thus com-
promising the people’s right to clean water.124 
The Robinson Township plurality “recognize[d] that, as a practical matter, air 
and water quality have relative rather than absolute attributes.”125 As is the case 
with most other conventional water and air pollutants, carbon dioxide is a naturally 
occurring substance necessary for life and the maintenance of the climate, and it is 
only when the concentration of the pollutant becomes too high that natural pro-
cesses are disrupted. For example, when the ERA recognizes a right to “pure wa-
ter,” this means water with levels of nutrients that support the normal functioning 
of aquatic ecosystems, and that conserves and maintains public natural resources, 
but not so high as to cause eutrophication.126 Likewise, when the ERA recognizes a 
right to “clean air,” it means, as applied to carbon dioxide, levels necessary to sup-
port plant life and ecosystems, among other things, but not so high as to disrupt 
ecosystems, as will occur in climate disruption. Similarly, “pure water” means wa-
ter with levels of carbon dioxide that support the normal functioning of aquatic 
ecosystems, and that conserves and maintains public natural resources, but not so 
high as to acidify the water and disrupt those natural systems. 
In addition to clean air and water, a stable climate also provides critical natural 
and historic values of the environment. There can be little doubt that the relatively 
stable climate that has persisted since the end of the last Ice Age facilitated the rise 
 122. PA CONST. art. I, § 27, cl. 1. 
 123. PA CLIMATE IMPACTS, supra note 89, at 132. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 953 (Pa. 2013) (plurality). 
 126. Nitrogen compounds and phosphorus in water are necessary for supporting the plant life 
that supports the aquatic ecosystem, but when levels of these substances become too high eutrophication 
occurs and depletes oxygen, killing aquatic organisms and disrupting aquatic ecosystems are disrupted. 
Likewise, chromium is a heavy metal essential to life that we include in vitamin pills, but at too high a 
level it becomes a poison.  
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of civilization.127 As the reports described above indicate, a stable climate also pre-
vents the increasing incidence of vector-borne diseases and adverse effects from air 
pollution128 and protects winter recreation.129 The assessments discussed above also 
establish that climate disruption will impair scenic and esthetic values of the envi-
ronment by causing dramatic changes in forests and agriculture and by reducing or 
eliminating key species like trout.130 
In addition, the right to a natural climate unaffected by human-caused climate 
disruption is included within the second clause’s protection of the public’s right to 
the conservation and maintenance of public natural resources. The Robinson Town-
ship plurality emphasized that the concept of public natural resources encompassed 
a wide range of values of the natural environment: 
At present, the concept of public natural resources includes not only 
state-owned lands, waterways, and mineral reserves, but also resources 
that implicate the public interest, such as ambient air, surface and ground 
water, wild flora, and fauna (including fish) that are outside the scope of 
purely private property.131 
Catastrophic climate disruption would radically impair and possibly eliminate the 
“wild flora, and fauna (including fish),”132 public forests and their ecosystems, and 
game and wildlife133 that the plurality in Robinson Township expressly recognized as 
falling within the public trust obligations of the second and third clauses of Article 
I, § 27.134 
The Court in PEDF and the Robinson Township plurality both cite the ERA’s 
legislative history as supporting a broad construction of the public natural re-
sources that are made the property of all the people. As indicated earlier, the Rob-
inson Township plurality noted: 
[A]fter members of the General Assembly expressed disquietude that the 
enumeration of resources would be interpreted “to limit, rather than ex-
pand, [the] basic concept” of public natural resources, Section 27 was 
amended and subsequently adopted in its existing, unrestricted, form. 
The drafters seemingly signaled an intent that the concept of public natu-
 127. See RICHARD ALLEY, THE TWO-MILE TIME MACHINE: ICE CORES, ABRUPT CLIMATE 
CHANGE, AND OUR FUTURE (Princeton Univ. Press 2000); STORMS, supra note 117, at 39-40. 
 128. PA CLIMATE IMPACTS, supra note 89, at 11. 
 129. Id. at 11-12. 
 130. Id. at 8-10 (agriculture and forestry), 12 (trout), 
 131. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 955 (Pa. 2013) (plurality); accord Pa. En-
vtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 931 (Pa. 2017). 
 132. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955. 
 133. Id.; see also Huey & Ward, supra note 117 (such catastrophic climate disruption has harmed 
forests in the past); Alley et al., supra note 116; Warren et al., supra note 109. 
 134. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955.  
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ral resources would be flexible to capture the full array of resources impli-
cating the public interest, as these may be defined by statute or at com-
mon law.135 
The Court in PEDF similarly explained that the removal of the specific list and its 
replacement with more general language was intended to “discourage courts from 
limiting the scope of natural resources covered.”136 
The climate is not a private resource. Rather, the climate represents the sea-
sonal average ranges of temperature, precipitation and other atmospheric condi-
tions in a particular area over a long period of time.137 Climate determines the na-
ture of wild and other naturally occurring vegetation, fish and other wildlife; the 
amount and quality of ground and surface water; the characteristics of soils; the 
flow and extent of streams, rivers and wetlands; air quality; and most other charac-
teristics of naturally occurring ecosystems and natural communities. These consid-
erations all compel the conclusion that a stable climate, not disrupted by the types 
of changes caused by human emissions of GHGs in the atmosphere, should be un-
derstood as a public natural resource to which the people have a right and which 
the Commonwealth has a trustee’s duty to conserve and maintain.138 
However, under the express words of the ERA, the Commonwealth does not 
have a duty to “preserve” Pennsylvania’s climate unchanged.139 Indeed, it would be 
impossible for the Commonwealth to do so, given the international nature of the 
problem and the fact that many future changes will occur because of the current 
levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. However, as noted by the Robinson 
Township plurality, the constitutional provision uses the words “conserve and main-
tain,” rather than “preserve.”140 This means that “the duties to conserve and main-
tain are tempered by legitimate development tending to improve upon the lot of 
Pennsylvania’s citizenry, with the evident goal of promoting sustainable develop-
ment.”141 In further support of this proposition, the plurality cited the Montana 
Supreme Court’s holding that a constitutional provision providing an “inaliena-
 135. Id. (citing 1970 PA. LEGIS. JOURNAL–HOUSE at 2271–75). 
 136. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 931. 
 137. Climate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/climate (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2018); see also FLANNERY, supra note 81 at 19-26. 
 138. Cf. In re Application of Maui Elec. Co., 141 P.3d. 1 (Haw. 2017). The case involved a chal-
lenge by citizens to a power purchase agreement with a fossil-fuel-fired power plant. The Hawai’i Con-
stitution guarantees each person “the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws 
relating to environmental quality.” HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9. The court held that the petitioners 
demonstrated “a threatened injury to the[ir] right to a clean and healthful environment from the effect 
of greenhouse gas emissions,” and thus had a right to a hearing on their claims. In other words, the right 
to a “clean and healthful environment” in Hawai’i includes a right to be protected against human-caused 
climate change. 
 139. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 948 (Pa. 2013) (plurality). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  
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ble . . . right to a clean and healthful environment”142 did “not protect merely 
against type[s] of environmental degradation ‘conclusively linked’ to ill health or 
physical endangerment and animal death, but could be invoked to provide anticipa-
tory and preventative protection against unreasonable degradation of natural re-
sources.”143 
Finally, the public trust rights under Article I, § 27 inhere in “all the people 
including generations yet to come.”144 Thus, the virtual certainty that effects of 
climate disruption will be inequitably distributed and will have greater impacts on 
generations yet to come145 implicates Article I, § 27 even if only some people are 
adversely affected. As the Robinson Township plurality explained, disparate effects 
are “irreconcilable with the express command that the trustee will manage the cor-
pus of the trust for the benefit of ‘all the people.’ ”146 The Commonwealth’s obliga-
tion also derives from the trustee responsibility of impartiality. “Dealing impartial-
ly with all beneficiaries means that the trustee must treat all equitably in light of 
the purposes of the trust.”147 For many reasons, the right to a natural climate unaf-
fected by human-caused climate disruption is protected under both parts of Article 
I, § 27. 
2.  Commonwealth Duties Concerning Climate Disruption 
The Commonwealth has several overall duties under Article I, § 27 concerning 
climate disruption. Under the first clause, the Commonwealth may not act contra-
ry to the people’s right to a natural climate unaffected by climate disruption; “laws 
 142. Id. at 953 (citations omitted). 
 143. Id. 
 144. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27, cl. 2. 
 145. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 
SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 17 (2014). 
Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, 
warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, wide-
spread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence). Mitigation involves some level of 
co-benefits and of risks due to adverse side effects, but these risks do not involve the same 
possibility of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts as risks from climate change, in-
creasing the benefits from near-term mitigation efforts. 
Id. 
See also Richard L. Revesz & Matthrew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future Generations, 84 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1097 (2010-2011); Kevin Clarke, How Will Climate Change Affect the Next Generation? U.S. 
CATHOLIC, Oct. 2013, at 39, http://www.uscatholic.org/articles/201309/how-will-climate-change-
affect-next-generation-27900. 
 146. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 980 (Pa. 2013) (plurality). 
 147. Id. at 959. Thus, legislative decisions under which “some properties and communities will 
carry much heavier environmental and habitability burdens than others” are inconsistent with the obli-
gation that the trustee act for the benefit of “all the people.” Id. at 1007 (using this argument to justify 
its decision that Section 3304 of Act 13 violates Article I, § 27).  
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of the Commonwealth that unreasonably impair the right are unconstitutional.”148 
Under the second and third clauses of the public trust provisions of Article I, § 27, 
the Commonwealth has two duties. One is “to prohibit the degradation, diminu-
tion, and depletion”149 of a natural climate unaffected by human-caused climate 
disruption, whether harm to the climate results “from direct state action or from 
the actions of private parties.”150 The other is “to act affirmatively via legislative 
action”151 to conserve the natural climate and prevent undue disruption.152 A third 
duty, which stems from the duty of private trust law duty of prudence, is that the 
Commonwealth must analyze the effect of its decisions on the public’s right to be 
protected against climate change prior to making them.153 
The inclusion of a right to a natural climate not disrupted by GHG pollution 
has three additional consequences for the Commonwealth as it interprets and ap-
plies existing statutes, regulations, and other laws. These consequences, in which 
Article I, § 27 plays more of a supporting role in the implementation of existing 
law, are based on cases decided before Robinson Township and PEDF.154 The first of 
these involves the scope of the police power exercised by the state and local gov-
ernments.155 As a consequence of PEDF, state and local police power is constrained 
by a duty not to violate Article I, § 27 and an obligation to properly implement the 
public trust responsibilities.156 These constraints and obligations apply to human-
caused climate disruption. In addition, the Commonwealth has an obligation to 
interpret that law in a way that furthers constitutional rights when the meaning of 
a statute, regulation, or other law is unclear.157 As a result, the Commonwealth has 
an obligation to interpret ambiguous laws in a way that furthers the constitutional 
right of people to be protected against human-caused climate change. Finally, 
Pennsylvania courts have previously used Article I, § 27 to support the constitu-
tionality of laws that have been challenged on other grounds, including challenges 
to executive action based on claims that the action lacked sufficient statutory au-
 148. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 951; Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 931 
(Pa. 2017). 
 149. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 933. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 937 (quoting Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d 361 A.2d 
263 (Pa. 1976)). 
 154. Dernbach, supra note 5, at 150-61. 
 155. Id. at 150-56; John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45 
ENVTL. L. 463, 515-16 (2015). 
 156. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 938 (Pa. 2017). 
 157. Dernbach, supra note 5, at 156-58; 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922 (1970) (“In ascertaining the 
intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions, among 
others, may be used: . . .3. That the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of 
the United States or of this Commonwealth.”).  
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thorization.158 It follows that legal challenges to Commonwealth actions to protect 
against climate disruption could be defended on the grounds that they are imple-
menting Article I, § 27. 
3. Funk v. Wolf 
In Funk v. Wolf,159 the plaintiffs asserted that the ERA imposed an affirmative 
duty on the Commonwealth to adopt and implement regulations to protect future 
generations from climate disruption, and that the court should grant mandamus 
requiring this.160 The Commonwealth Court, affirmed by the Court, avoided de-
ciding that issue. However, the Commonwealth Court appears to have assumed 
that prevention of climate disruption falls within the scope of Article 1, § 27’s 
rights and duties and that the Commonwealth had a duty to promulgate regula-
tions “to reduce CO2 and GHG emissions” pursuant to Pennsylvania Air Pollution 
Control Act (APCA).161 The Court further acknowledged that petitioners had a 
right to submit a rulemaking petition to the Pennsylvania Environmental Quality 
Board (EQB) seeking the adoption of a specific regulation under the APCA limit-
ing GHG emissions, and that the EQB’s action with respect to that petition would 
be subject to judicial review.162 The EQB is the Pennsylvania entity that adopts or 
modifies regulations that are implemented by DEP; DEP does not have authority 
to adopt its own regulations.163 As we discuss further in this article, the APCA au-
thorizes the adoption of a regulation establishing an economy-wide cap-and-trade 
program with allowances distributed by auction with a reserve price. The EQB’s 
refusal to consider such a regulation, or its adoption of an insufficiently protective 
regulation, could then be subject to judicial review and overturned. 
The plaintiffs in Funk initially filed a petition with the EQB seeking the adop-
tion of a regulation limiting GHG emissions to prevent undue climate disruption, 
without proposing a specific regulation or even a specific regulatory approach.164 
Based on DEP’s representation that it was already responding to climate disrup-
tion, the EQB denied the petition.165 In fact, DEP’s actions were largely token ef-
 158. Dernbach, supra note 5, at 158-61; see, e.g., Eagle Envtl. II, L.P. v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 584 Pa. 494 (2005). 
 159. Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) aff’d without opinion, 158 A.3d 642 (Pa. 
2017). 
 160. Id. at 232-33. 
 161. Id. at 250. 
 162. Id. at 243. 
 163. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 510-20 (2018). 
 164. Acceptance of Rulemaking Petition for Study, 43 Pa. Bull. 7095 (Dec. 7, 2013); Funk v. 
Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 243 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) aff’d without opinion, 158 A.3d 642 (Pa. 2017). 
 165. Acceptance of Recommendation, 44 Pa. Bull. 5679 (Aug. 30, 2014).  
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forts166  falling far short of the emissions reductions necessary to prevent climate 
disruption.167 Instead of appealing, the plaintiffs brought a mandamus action in the 
Commonwealth Court against the Commonwealth, the Governor of Pennsylvania, 
DEP and other agencies. The complaint sought declaratory relief regarding the 
plaintiffs’ rights and the Commonwealth’s duties under the ERA.168 It further 
sought injunctive relief that would require the Commonwealth to conduct various 
studies.169 The complaint also sought a court order requiring DEP to study, and to 
prepare and implement: 
comprehensive regulations, in accordance with the current science, de-
signed to account for embedded emissions and reduce carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gas emissions to safe levels and thereby reach the con-
centrations that must be achieved to satisfy [the Commonwealth defend-
ants’] constitutional obligations as public trustees of the air and atmos-
phere.170 
The Commonwealth Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the deci-
sion.171 In so holding, it reasoned, inter alia, that “we would have appellate jurisdic-
tion over a final order of the EQB denying a rulemaking petition . . . , and a final 
order of the Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) denying an appeal of a DEP 
 166. PADEP’s report upon which the EQB relied in denying the petition cited a number of ac-
tions in the Department’s 2009 climate plan that the Department projected would decrease emissions 
between the base year 2005 and 2020 by under 10 million metric tons, or less than 3.6 percent over a 
fifteen-year period.  See PENNSYLVANIA DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., RECOMMENDATION TO THE 
PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY BOARD ON THE ASHLEY FUNK PETITION FOR 
RULEMAKING TO REDUCE CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS 13 (2014) (Figure 1), http://
files.dep.state.pa.us/PublicParticipation/Public%20Participation%20Center/PubPartCenterPortalFiles/
Environmental%20Quality%20Board/2014/August%2019,%202014%20EQB%20meeting/
Ashley%20Funk/1%20-%20DEP%20Recommendation.pdf.  While the Paris Agreement calls for reach-
ing climate neutrality by the second half of this century to limit climate disruption, the rate of reduction 
from the 2009 Plan measures described in the Department’s report would not achieve climate neutrality 
for over four centuries, well into the 25th century.  Indeed, the Department concedes that not all of the 
measures in the 2009 plan had been implemented.  Id. at 30.  That report also cited a number of other 
actions described in the 2013 climate plan update with no projection of emissions reductions.  Many of 
these actions were federal actions undertaken by the Obama Administration, such as the Clean Power 
Plan and others constituted measures to reduce increased methane emissions from the shale gas expan-
sion in Pennsylvania.  The Petitioner described these reductions as “modest” and “self-congratulatory,” 
“falling short of the Department’s ‘constitutional obligation.’”  Id. at 25.  The Department’s report fails 
to provide any correlation between the emissions reductions it cites and the goal of keeping temperature 
increases below 2ºC.  Id. at 28. In fact, that report specifically rejects the Petitioner’s position that emis-
sions should be reduced to zero by 2050.  Id. at 38. 
 167. See discussion supra note 166. 
 168. Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 237 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d without opinion, 158 A.3d 
642 (Pa. 2017). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 238. 
 171. Id. at 241-43.  
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decision to not submit a rulemaking petition to the EQB. . . .”172 The Court also 
concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the action.173 
However, the Commonwealth Court ultimately dismissed the action because 
it found that there was not a sufficiently express mandatory duty that would trig-
ger the remedy of mandamus.174 The Court’s decision was not premised upon an 
interpretation of Article I, § 27, but on the narrow scope of the remedy of manda-
mus: 
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy “designed to compel the perfor-
mance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty, as opposed to a discretion-
ary act. . . .”  Mandamus cannot be used to direct the exercise of judgment 
or discretion in any particular way. . . . Nor will it issue to establish legal 
rights. . . . We may issue a writ of mandamus only where the petitioner 
has a clear legal right to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or 
mandatory duty, the defendant has a corresponding duty to perform the 
act[,] and the petitioner has no other adequate or appropriate reme-
dy. . . .175 
In this regard, the Court found that the question presented in considering a writ of 
mandamus was not “whether the ERA imposes mandatory duties in the general 
sense, but whether the ERA provides . . . a clear right to the performance of the 
specific acts” requested and “whether the[ir] performance . . . is mandatory.”176 The 
Court reasoned that the remedy of mandamus could not be invoked to expand the 
authority of executive agencies.  It also explained that a judicially enforceable 
mandatory duty required legislation creating such a mandate, which the Court 
found lacking.177 
Although the Court’s ultimate decision was premised upon the scope of relief 
that could be awarded by a court under the narrow equitable writ of mandamus, 
the decision also relied upon the application of the three-part balancing test that 
unduly limited the scope of the ERA, and which the PEDF Court expressly reject-
ed.178 Consequently, the Commonwealth Court in Funk appears to have overstated 
the discretion afforded to both the General Assembly and the executive branch and 
to have understated the scope of the duties imposed by the ERA and the role of 
the judicial branch in enforcing those duties. It did so by effectively saying that 
 172. Id. at 243. 
 173. Id. at 248. 
 174. Id. at 251-52. 
 175. Id. at 248 (citations omitted). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 248-50. 
 178. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 930 (Pa. 2017) (rejecting three-
part test because it “strips the constitutional provision of its meaning.”); see Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 
228, 234 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) aff’d without opinion, 158 A.3d 642 (Pa. 2017).  
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compliance with the ERA requires executive agencies only to follow the law pre-
scribed by the General Assembly.179 
Even under the unduly circumscribed three-part balancing test employed in 
Funk, the decision can be read to support the proposition that there is an enforcea-
ble duty to adopt a GHG emission regulation under the APCA, if the regulation is 
presented to the EQB in a detailed petition. The Commonwealth Court noted that 
“Respondents further acknowledge that the General Assembly, through the APCA, 
bestowed upon them a duty to promulgate and implement rules and regulations to 
reduce CO2 and GHG emissions.”
180 
Consequently, even in applying the unduly constrained test rejected by the 
Court in PEDF, the Commonwealth Court in Funk appears to conclude that the 
ERA creates rights and general duties, that there are specific duties for the EQB to 
consider a petition with an attached rule, and that there is a duty to adopt regula-
tions addressing climate change under the APCA. The Commonwealth Court not-
ed that if a proposal for a specific rule to address GHG emissions had been submit-
ted to the EQB, the EHB would have had jurisdiction to review the EQB’s final 
action denying the petition and the Commonwealth Court would have had juris-
diction to review the order of the EHB: 
While we agree that we would have appellate jurisdiction over a final or-
der of the EQB denying a rulemaking petition . . . and a final order of the 
Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) denying an appeal of a DEP deci-
sion to not submit a rulemaking petition to the EQB . . . , we would not 
have appellate jurisdiction over the instant matter.181 
EQB regulations prescribe a process for filing such a petition with the EQB 
and the EQB’s consideration of the petition.182 Following any denial of such a peti-
tion, a petitioner could bring an action for declaratory and injunctive relief.183 
 179. See, e.g., Funk, 144 A.3d at 235 (“[T]he balance between environmental and other societal 
concerns is primarily struck by the General Assembly, as the elected representatives of the people, 
through legislative action.”). 
 180. Id. at 250. In a footnote, the Court elaborated on the source of this duty, noting that  
the Commonwealth’s duties to this end derive, in part, from Section 5(a)(8) of the APCA, 
35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4004(1), which requires the EQB to adopt rules and regulations to 
implement the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q. The United States Su-
preme Court, in Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007), had “little 
trouble” concluding that GHGs are “air pollutants” as defined by the Act and that the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency may regulate GHGs.  
Id. at 250, n.17. 
 181. Id. at 243. 
 182. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 23.1-.8 (2000). 
 183. See Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2016 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 
830 *62-63; 46 ELR 20179 (Nov. 8, 2016) (granting petition for review in part, in industry’s action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to newly proposed oil and gas regulations). There would  
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Consequently, a petitioner could ask the EQB to promulgate a rulemaking to ad-
dress greenhouse gases, and any denial of such a petition would be subject to judi-
cial review. The Court’s analysis in PEDF only reinforces the conclusion that the 
Commonwealth’s duty to adopt such a regulation is both mandatory and judicially 
enforceable. 
IV.  THE COMMONWEALTH’S DUTY TO PREVENT AND MITIGATE 
HUMAN-CAUSED CLIMATE DISRUPTION REQUIRES THAT 
PENNSYLVANIA UNDERTAKE MEASURES TO REDUCE GHG EMISSIONS 
TO THE LEVEL WARRANTED BY THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON AND TO 
ACHIEVE CARBON NEUTRALITY BY MID-CENTURY 
Because a stable climate not disrupted by human caused GHG emissions is a 
right protected under the ERA’s first clause and a public natural resource for which 
the Commonwealth is a trustee, the ERA’s text directs that the Commonwealth 
shall “conserve and maintain” that stable climate for “all the people, including gen-
erations yet to come.”184 Neither the text of the ERA nor the law of trusts provides 
additional guidance on concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere that will con-
serve the climate, the trajectory of emissions reductions necessary to avoid exceed-
ing that concentration, or Pennsylvania’s responsibility vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. Pennsylvania’s contribution to GHG emissions exceeds that of most na-
tions.185 If states were counted as nations, Pennsylvania would have ranked as the 
sixteenth highest emitter in 2003.186 Nevertheless, its actions alone will be insuffi-
cient to “conserve and maintain” the climate.187 
be no adequate remedy requiring such a petitioner to wait for PADEP to take some action that would 
be appealable to the Environmental Hearing Board. See Arsenal Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 505 Pa. 
198, 209-10 (1984) (Commonwealth Court erred in declining to exercise equitable jurisdiction over in-
dustry’s petition to enjoin the Department of Environmental Resources from implementing or enforc-
ing regulations promulgated by the EQB, where the internal administrative process would subject the 
industry to litigation and regulatory uncertainty). A fortiori, if there is no adequate remedy for an indus-
try that must undertake litigation and experience regulatory uncertainty during a post-enforcement 
proceeding by PADEP, there is no adequate remedy for a petitioner seeking a rulemaking to address 
GHG emissions that is never even promulgated in the first place. 
 184. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 185. See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Adam Rose, & Coreen Ripp, Incentive-Based Approaches to 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in Pennsylvania: Protecting the Environment and Promoting Fiscal Reform, 14 
WIDENER L.J. 205, 217 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Pennsylvania’s gross GHG emissions in 2013 totaled 305.75 million metric tons. See PA. 
DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY 2016 4 (2016), http://
files.dep.state.pa.us/Air/AirQuality/AQPortalFiles/Advisory%20Committees/CCAC/Docs/Inventory-
2016_1-18-17_(final).pdf. See also Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 524-25 (2007). 
The Supreme Court rejected EPA’s argument that regulation of automobile emissions in the United 
States, which then totaled 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide and represented “more than 6% of 
worldwide carbon dioxide emissions” would fail to meet the “causation” element of standing.  The  
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Finally, the ERA does not tell us how Pennsylvania should exercise its duty to 
prevent climate disruption. At a minimum, one might argue that the constitutional 
standard requires Pennsylvania to do as much as it can, using existing authority. 
One can look to other sources of authority defining what is required to “conserve 
and maintain” a stable climate, Pennsylvania’s share of responsibility, and the 
means that can be employed. Specifically, as we discuss below, binding treaty law 
and other federal law define the temperature and concentration goals and Pennsyl-
vania’s share. As recognized by the Funk decision, the APCA provides available 
tools for limiting emissions.188 Those tools can be defined in a properly framed 
regulation presented by way of a petition to the EQB.189 The EQB’s action on that 
petition can be subject to judicial review under the equitable writ of certiorari ra-
ther than mandamus.190 As further described below, whether framed as the “as 
much as it can” standard or a standard incorporating these other sources of authori-
ty, at a minimum the mechanism should include a trading program that reduces 
emissions to the level warranted by the social cost of carbon and ultimately to 
achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century. 
A.  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Federal Clean Air Act Provide Judicially Ascertainable Standards Governing the 
Extent of Reductions Required to Conserve and Maintain a Stable Climate and 
Pennsylvania’s Relative Responsibility 
A judicially ascertainable standard for determining the emissions reductions 
required to conserve and maintain the climate is provided by an international trea-
ty ratified by the United States, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC),191 the Paris Agreement192 adopted pursuant to that 
Court reasoned that the fact “[t]hat a first step might be tentative does not by itself support the notion 
that federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step conforms to law.” The Court further 
reasoned that “[j]udged by any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful contribution 
to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according to petitioners, to global warming.” Id. at 525. 
 188. Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 250 n.17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d without opinion, 158 
A.3d 642 (Pa. 2017). 
 189. 25 PA. CODE § 23.1. 
 190. Funk, 144 A.3d at 242-43. 
 191. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 4, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107, http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/
conveng.pdf. (providing a general framework for the international reduction of GHG emissions). 
 192. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 
2015, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php [hereinafter The Paris Agreement]. President 
Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement. Donald J. 
Trump, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord., THE WHITE HOUSE (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.  
However, that announcement will be ineffective with respect to Pennsylvania’s interpretation of the 
ERA and likely will also be ineffective with respect to federal law. First, no withdrawal can take effect 
until November 2020, because parties are not entitled to withdraw until three years after the Agreement  
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Convention, and the body of internationally-accepted scientific evidence endorsed 
by the nations of the world pursuant to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. 
Pennsylvania’s share of the reductions is governed by the federal Clean Air Act.193 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Pennsylvania is 
bound to interpret its constitution consistent with treaties which, along with the 
United States Constitution and federal laws, constitute the “supreme Law of the 
Land” that binds state courts.194 
The objective of the UNFCCC is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concen-
trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”195 While the Convention does not further 
identify what that level is, the 2015 Paris Agreement does.196 In the run-up to the 
entered into force and withdrawal does not take effect until one year after the withdrawal. The Paris 
Agreement, art. 28. Second, the Paris Agreement merely interprets the UNFCCC, from which the Unit-
ed States has not withdrawn, and which remains therefore binding law under Article III of the Consti-
tution. Finally, the pertinent requirements of the UNFCCC as interpreted by the UNFCCC are likely 
now customary international law that will be binding on the United States and its states notwithstand-
ing the United States’ withdrawal. Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Thomas D. Peterson & Steven Chester, 
Unlocking Willpower Part Two, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10135, 10137-38 (2017); see also Robert B. McKinstry, 
Jr., What Really Happened? Implications of President Trump’s Announcement on U.S. Withdrawal From the 
Paris Agreement and the Law of Unintended Consequences, BALLARD SPAHR (July 2017) at 1-2,  
https://response.ballardspahr.com/email_handler.aspx?sid=5427bed1-f563-45e1-8cb1-74758039dace
&redirect=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ballardspahr.com%2f%7e%2fmedia%2fFiles%2fArticles%2fWhat_
Really_Happened (It is important to note that even if the Paris Agreement’s definition of the intent of 
the UNFCCC to prevent “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” should not 
be considered binding law, the international scientific consensus reflected in the Paris Agreement can 
equally define the emissions reductions required to fulfill the Commonwealth’s duty as a trustee to con-
serve and maintain a stable climate.). 
 193. See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2012). 
 194. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. The Charming Betsy doctrine, requiring that federal law be 
construed consistent with the “law of nations,” should be equally binding with respect to the interpreta-
tion of state constitutional law. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
 195. UNFCCC, supra note 191, art. 2. 
 196. The Paris Agreement, supra note 192, art. 2, § 1. 
This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objec-
tive, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of 
sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by: . . .(a) Holding the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and 
to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, rec-
ognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. 
Id. See also id. art. 4 § 1. 
In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim to reach 
global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will 
take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in 
accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this 
century. 
Id.  
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Paris Conference, the Conference of the Parties translated the Framework Con-
vention’s stabilization objective into a maximum permissible surface temperature 
increase. The most frequently stated goal was 2°C (or 3.6° F) above pre-industrial 
levels.197 Reflecting the evolving scientific consensus on the temperature rise at 
which serious climate disruption will occur, the Paris Agreement aims to hold “the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels.”198 The parties also agreed “to pursue efforts to limit the temperature in-
crease to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly 
reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.”199 
Also reflecting the scientific consensus of the nations of the world, the Paris 
Agreement further defines the emissions reductions required to keep temperatures 
below those thresholds by requiring that the Parties “achieve a balance between 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in 
the second half of this century.”200 If the entire world needs to reach a point where 
emissions of GHGs are no greater than their removal by GHG sinks by the second 
half of this century, Pennsylvania will also need to achieve that balance by that 
time. Therefore, at a minimum, Pennsylvania must develop an emissions reduction 
trajectory that reduces net emissions to zero, meaning the elimination of all GHG 
emissions other than those geologically or biologically returned to sinks (i.e. se-
questered) by the second half of the 21st century. Because Pennsylvania’s GHG 
emissions are disproportionately higher than most of the rest of the world, Penn-
sylvania should achieve that goal by mid-century. 
This goal furthers the UNFCCC requirement that the developed nations take 
the lead in reducing emissions, enacting policies to limit emissions, and enhance 
carbon sinks.201 These policies are to be precautionary, comprehensive and “cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost . . . and comprise 
all economic sectors.”202 There is a scientific consensus, reflected in a growing 
 197. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Confer-
ence of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, ¶ 4, U.N. 
Doc. 1/CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/
eng/07a01.pdf. 
 198. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, Deci-
sion 1/CP.21, art. 2.1(a), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. art. 4, § 1. 
 201. UNFCCC, supra note 191, art. 3, § 1; art. 3 § 3; art. 4, § 2(a); The Paris Agreement, supra, 
note 192, art. 4, § 4. 
 202. UNFCCC, supra note 191, art. 3, § 3; see The Paris Agreement, supra note 192, art. 4,  § 4 
(requiring the United States and other developed country parties to take the lead in achieving the nec-
essary reductions); UNFCCC, supra note 191, art. 4, § 2(a)(calling for the adoption of “policies and take 
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs”); UNFCCC, 
supra note 191, art. 3, § 2 (requiring each nation to consider impacts beyond those within its borders,  
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number of state and local emissions reduction goals, that developed nations need to 
reduce their total economy-wide emissions by at least 80% from 1990 levels by 
2050.203 Moreover, a growing number of studies, including a study by the World 
Bank, have concluded that this goal is achievable.204 
The provisions of the federal Clean Air Act governing the obligations of states 
support the proposition that Pennsylvania should consider these treaty obligations 
in construing its obligations as a trustee under Article I, § 27. Section 115 of the 
Clean Air Act is triggered whenever the EPA finds air pollution originating within 
a state “cause[s] or contribute[s] to air pollution which may reasonably be antici-
pated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country.”205 When that 
happens, the EPA must require the state to submit an amendment to the “good 
neighbor” provision of its state implementation plan206 that will “prevent or elimi-
nate the endangerment.”207 In its endangerment finding, EPA found that emis-
sions of GHGs within the United States endanger health and the environment in 
other nations.208  Virtually all other nations of the world are parties to the 
considering “the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those 
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”). 
 203. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-30-15 (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2015/04/29/
news18938/; Conn. Exec. Order No. 46 P1 (2015); Colo. Exec. Order No. D 004 08 § 1 (Apr. 22, 
2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21N, § 3(b)(4); Mich. Exec. Dir. 2009-4 Section II; 2015 Minn. Laws 
216H.02 subd 1; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-38 (West 2009); N.Y. Exec. Order No. 24 (2009), https://
www.dec.ny.gov/energy/71394.html; 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-6.2-2(a)(C) (2014). 
 204. MARIANNE FAY ET AL., INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV./THE WORLD 
BANK, DECARBONIZING DEVELOPMENT: THREE STEPS TO A ZERO-CARBON FUTURE 96 (2015), 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Climate/dd/decarbonizing-
development-report.pdf; JEFFREY SACH, ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS 
NETWORK AND THE INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. AND INT’L RELATIONS, PATHWAYS TO DEEP 
DECARBONIZATION IX (Emmanuel Guérin, et al. eds. 2014), http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/09/DDPP_Digit_updated.pdf; see also John C. Dernbach, Creating Legal Pathways to a Zero Carbon 
Future, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY: ESSAYS INSPIRED BY 
THE IPCC 21 (Robin Kundis Craig & Stephen R. Miller eds. 2016). 
Because the endpoint will be carbon neutrality, this will be required of Pennsylvania under any 
scenario. 
 205. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (2016). 
 206. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii) (2016). 
 207. Id. § 7415(b) (2015). 
 208. Endangerment Finding, supra note 82, at 66,514 (The EPA made the finding in connection 
with its determination that the impacts of climate change in foreign nations would, in turn, endanger 
health and welfare within the United States: 
EPA is not considering international effects to determine whether the health and welfare of 
the public in a foreign country is endangered. Instead, EPA’s consideration of international 
effects for purposes of determining endangerment is limited to how those international ef-
fects impact the health and welfare of the U.S. population); 
Id. The precise nature of the Administrator’s finding regarding international effects is set forth in the 
proposed finding, which the Administrator adopted in the final action:  
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UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, which provides the United States reciprocal 
rights with respect to the prevention and control of greenhouse gases.209 These 
facts trigger the obligation to reduce GHG emissions to prevent endangerment in 
On a global basis, according to the IPCC, projected climate change-related impacts are like-
ly to affect the health of millions of people, particularly those with low adaptive capacity, as 
a result of a number of factors including increased cardio respiratory diseases due to higher 
concentrations of groundlevel ozone brought on by higher temperatures, and by more fre-
quent and intense heat waves. Food production is expected to be much more vulnerable to 
climate change in poorer regions of the world compared to food production in the U.S. The 
IPCC also identified that the coasts around the world are experiencing the adverse conse-
quences of hazards related to climate and sea level. Coastal settlements are highly vulnerable 
to extreme events, such as storms which impose substantial costs on coastal societies. Eco-
systems and species around the world are very likely to show a wide range of vulnerabilities 
to climate change, depending on the extent to which climate change alters conditions that 
could cross critical thresholds. The most vulnerable ecosystems include coral reefs, sea-ice 
ecosystems, high-latitude boreal forests, and mountain ecosystems where there is no possi-
bility of migrating to adapt to climate change. 
Climate change impacts in certain regions of the world may exacerbate problems that raise 
humanitarian, trade and national security issues for the U.S. Climate change has been de-
scribed as a potential threat multiplier regarding national security issues. This is because, as 
noted above, climate change can aggravate existing problems in certain regions of the world 
such as poverty, social tensions, general environmental degradation, and conflict over in-
creasingly scarce water resources. 
Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18886, 18903 (Apr. 24, 2009). Although the Administrator 
stated that she was not making a foreign endangerment finding, these factual determinations regarding 
effects in foreign nations underlying her determination that these effects would cause endangerment in 
the United States effectively constitute a finding that GHG emissions in the United States cause or 
contribute to endangerment in other nations. 
 209. See Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS, https://unfccc.int/process/the-
convention/what-is-the-convention/status-of-ratification-of-the-convention (196 nations and 1 regional 
economic integration organization are Parties) (last visited Apr. 17, 2018); UNFCCC Status as of 17-04-
2018, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=
IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited July 9, 2018); Paris 
Agreement – Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS, https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/
status-of-ratification (175 Parties have ratified of 197 Parties to the Convention) (last visited Apr. 17, 
2018); Paris Agreement Status as at 17-04-2018, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en 
(last visited July 4, 2018). See The Paris Agreement art. 2 § 1 (a), art. 3, art. 4 § 1 (Article 3 of the Paris 
Agreement calls for all Parties “to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts” as defined further in 
the Agreement “with the view to achieving the purpose of the Agreement as set out in Article 2,” viz. 
limiting GHG emissions to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C 
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels” by achieving net emissions neutrality by the second half of the century. Thus, there 
are reciprocal rights and obligations to reduce emissions among the 175 parties to the Agreement.). See 
generally Michael Burger et. al., Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under Section 115 of 
the Clean Air Act, UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-11 (Jan. 2016), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2742366.  
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other nations within the meaning of section 115.210  Further, the Clean Air Act’s 
good neighbor provision requires that each state implementation plan include “ad-
equate provisions . . . insuring compliance with the requirements of section . . . 
[115] of this title (relating to . . . international air pollution).”211 Although EPA has 
not issued a call for states to submit state implementation plans (SIPs) to reduce 
GHG emissions under section 115, the predicates triggering the mandatory obliga-
tion to do so exist. Thus, Pennsylvania’s obligations under the Clean Air Act’s 
good neighbor provision also exist. These create an obligation for Pennsylvania, as 
a fiduciary under the ERA, to take action to reduce emissions to prevent endan-
germent of foreign nations from GHG pollution consistent with the good neighbor 
provision. 
B.  Pennsylvania’s Obligation as a Trustee Should Require that GHG Emissions 
Be Limited to the Extent Consistent with the Social Cost of Carbon and to 
Achieve Carbon Neutrality by Mid-Century 
A regulatory program that is designed to take all measures reasonably neces-
sary to conserve the corpus of the environmental trust resource for the benefit of 
the trust’s beneficiaries will most closely hew to the intent and text of the ERA as 
interpreted in PEDF and the Robinson Township plurality. That program should 
therefore employ all measures reasonably necessary to conserve a stable climate 
and the public environmental resources it supports. As explained further below, 
this can be best accomplished by putting a price on emissions of GHGs at least 
equal to the social cost of carbon and by recovering the value of that emissions 
price as income for the beneficiaries of the trust. We will explain below the deriva-
tion of this “social cost of carbon” and its relevance to Pennsylvania’s constitutional 
obligations as a trustee under the ERA. 
1.  The Relationship of the Social Cost of Carbon to Pennsylvania’s 
Obligations as a Trustee 
In economic theory, the impacts of climate disruption represent “externalities” 
of the emissions of GHGs that are not reflected in the market price of the products 
whose manufacture produces those emissions.212 Under that theory, those who emit 
GHGs are appropriating the resources they damage without paying for the dam-
age. Principles of economic efficiency, as well as equity, require that those respon-
sible for the damage pay for it and that the damage be reflected in the price of the 
 210. See Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 912 F.2d 1525, 1528 
(D.C. Cir. 1990); see also McKinstry, Peterson & Chester, supra note 192, at 10142. 
 211. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(ii) (2012). 
 212. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED CONSEQUENCES 
OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE 28-29 (2010).  
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goods whose manufacture will cause the damage. If the cost of reducing emissions 
is less than the cost of the damages avoided, the emitter will reduce the emissions, 
creating a net increase in social welfare; the market will therefore favor activities 
that do not emit the GHGs that cause the damage.213 The social cost of carbon is a 
measure of the future estimated cost or damage resulting from the emission of a 
metric ton of carbon today; imposing that cost on carbon emissions today will shift 
economic activity to other activities that do not result in that cost or damage.214 
There have been a number of efforts to calculate this social cost of carbon. Be-
cause a series of Executive Orders required that federal agencies prepare cost-
benefit analyses to assess the impact of regulatory actions, the United States con-
vened an interagency task force to determine this social cost of carbon, producing 
reports in 2010 and 2016.215 Based on updated data on the damages caused by cli-
mate disruption, the 2016 report calculated a variety of values representing the av-
erage and high cost of GHG emissions for different time periods and discount 
rates.216 As action is delayed, the social cost of carbon increases because the damage 
 213. Id. at 32; see McKinstry, Rose, & Ripp, supra note 185, at 214-221; see also SAMUEL A. 
NEWELL ET AL., N.Y. DEP’T. OF PUB. SERV., N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, PRICING CARBON INTO 
NYISO’S WHOLESALE ENERGY MARKET TO SUPPORT NEW YORK’S DECARBONIZATION GOALS 3 
(2017), https://www.energymarketers.com/Documents/Brattle_study_carbon_pricing.pdf. 
 214. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 212, at 60. 
 215. See Regulatory Planning & Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (requiring agen-
cies, to the extent permitted by law, “to assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation 
and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation 
only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs”); 
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON,  TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: 
SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 
(2010), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/scc_tsd_2010.
pdf; INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (2016), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2016-12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 SCC]; 
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, ADDENDUM TO 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866: APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY TO ESTIMATE 
THE SOCIAL COST OF METHANE AND THE SOCIAL COST OF NITROUS OXIDE (2016), https://
19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/addendum_to_sc-
ghg_tsd_august_2016.pdf. See Presidential Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic 
Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).  President Trump has issued an Executive Order direct-
ing the withdrawal of the social cost of carbon guidance. However, that Order has no binding legal ef-
fect standing alone and there are cogent reasons to believe that, if it were applied, that application 
would not withstand judicial review. The guidance represented the peer-reviewed consensus of a group 
of scientific and economic experts. The conclusions can no more be undone by unilateral executive fiat 
than can the conclusions of any other expert report. 
 216. 2016 SCC, supra note 215, at 4.  
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is greater, more imminent, discounted less.217 The 2016 report calculated that the 
average social cost of carbon in 2020 (using a discount rate of 3%) is $42/ton, but 
that the 95th percentile (high) cost would be $123/ton. In 2050, these figures in-
crease to $69/ton and $212/ton.218 These costs represent the marginal cost of 
avoiding future damage from the emission of a ton of carbon in any given year and 
they, therefore, do not include the damage that will already occur as a result of past 
emissions.219 
Federal agencies, states, and federal courts have relied upon the social cost of 
carbon in determining which measures should be employed to prevent GHG emis-
sions. Prior to 2017, federal agencies routinely relied upon the social cost of carbon 
developed by the expert panel in cost-benefit analyses.220 The Seventh Circuit spe-
 217. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET, SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 2 (2016), https://
19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/social_cost_of_carbon_fact_
sheet.pdf [hereinafter EPA SCC FACT SHEET]. 
 218. 2016 SCC, supra note 215, at 4, Table ES-1. 
Bob Litterman, one of the world’s leading economists on pricing risk suggests that the failure of the 
calculations of the social cost of carbon to incorporate high damage-low probability events results in a 
lower cost estimates and emphasizes that delay in mitigation by fifteen years will triple the social cost of 
carbon. Bob Litterman, Kent Daniel & Gernot Wagner, Applying Asset Pricing Theory to Calibrate 
the Price of Climate Risk 43 (Mar. 15, 2017), https://globalriskinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
05/GRI_Asset-Pricing-Climate-Risk_Mar-15-2017-Litterman.pdf. 
 219. EPA SCC FACT SHEET, supra note 217, at 1 (“The SC-CO2 is a measure, in dollars, of the 
long-term damage done by a ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in a given year. This dollar figure 
also represents the value of damages avoided for a small emission reduction (i.e., the benefit of a CO2 
reduction).”) 
 220. For example, the EPA SCC Fact Sheet that accompanied the release of the 2016 SCC gave 
the following examples of EPA’s use of the SCC in rulemakings: 
EPA has used the interagency group recommended estimates of the SC-CO2 to analyze the 
carbon dioxide impacts of various rulemakings since 2010. Examples of these rulemakings 
include: 
• The Joint EPA/Department of Transportation Rulemaking to establish Light-Duty 
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
Standards (2012-2016) 
• Amendments to the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants and 
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for the Portland Cement Manufacturing 
Industry 
• Regulatory Impact Results for the Reconsideration Proposal for National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional 
Boilers and Process Heaters at Major Sources 
• Proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for 
Mercury Emissions from Mercury Cell Chlor Alkali Plants 
• Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Sources: Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units Stand-
ards 
• Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards  
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cifically approved this use of that social cost of carbon in promulgating energy effi-
ciency regulations in Zero Zone v. Department of Energy.221 Both Illinois and New 
York relied upon the federally-determined social cost of carbon in the development 
of zero emissions credit (ZEC) programs to “encourage the preservation of the en-
vironmental values or attributes of zero-emissions nuclear-powered electric gener-
ating facilities for the benefit of the electric system, its customers and environ-
ment.”222 These programs provide assurances that the electricity generators will 
receive value equivalent to the avoided cost of carbon emissions calculated using 
the federal social cost of carbon.223 Federal district courts have rejected a variety of 
challenges to both state programs.224 
Although President Trump has issued an Executive Order withdrawing the 
federal social cost of carbon,225 that action should not preclude state reliance on the 
expert determinations underlying that metric. It is also doubtful that the President 
can reverse the determination of a panel of scientific experts by administrative fiat, 
particularly where regulations based on the scientific determination have been up-
held on judicial review and the derivation of the metric is consistent with princi-
ples of international law.226 
• Joint EPA/Department of Transportation Rulemaking to establish Medium- and 
Heavy- Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards 
• Proposed Carbon Pollution Standard for Future Power Plants 
• Joint EPA/Department of Transportation Rulemaking to establish 2017 and Later 
Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards. 
EPA SCC FACT SHEET, supra note 217, at 4-5. 
 221. Zero Zone v. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 677 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 222. Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), appeal 
filed (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) (quoting CES Order, app. E, at 1). 
 223. Id. at 562. Specifically, “the price of each ZEC is the social cost of carbon less the genera-
tor’s putative value of avoided greenhouse gas emissions less the amount of the forecast energy price.”  
Id. 
 224. Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, 2017 WL 3008289, No. 17 CV 1163 and 1164 (N.D. Ill. July 
14, 2017) (upholding Illinois program); Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. at 561 (upholding New York program). 
Although both programs are under appeal, the use of the federal social cost of carbon is not an issue in 
those appeals. 
 225. See Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017). 
 226. The action is reminiscent of the apocryphal story of King Canute’s attempt to hold back the 
tides cited in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980). The Regulatory Impact Statement sup-
porting EPA’s proposal to withdraw the Clean Power Plan uses a much lower social cost of carbon 
based on a limitation of consideration of damages to those that will occur only within the United States. 
This appears to be directly contrary to the UNFCCC’s principle applicable to all parties set forth in 
Article 3, Section 3 directing that rules “should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the 
lowest possible cost.” In other words, cost-effectiveness should consider global benefits in the form of 
reduced global damages rather than limiting that consideration to the benefits accruing to an individual 
nation or, in the case of Pennsylvania, state.  
 
MEA102.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2019  11:27 AM 
88 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 8:1 
The social cost of carbon has several implications with respect to the Com-
monwealth’s duties as a trustee under the reasoning of Robinson Township and 
PEDF. First, allowing emissions to continue unabated will increase the damage to 
the corpus of the trust.227 If a price is put on the emissions equal to the social cost 
of carbon, or emitters are otherwise required to implement all emissions reductions 
up to that cost, the damage to the corpus of the trust will be avoided consistent 
with the duty to “conserve and maintain” the trust corpus. Second, the social cost 
of carbon provides a way of measuring the cost of damage from climate change, 
including damage to public natural resources, through state actions allowing un-
regulated emissions of GHGs. Third, the Commonwealth’s duty to “act affirma-
tively via legislative action to protect the environment,”228 suggests that the state 
could use a mechanism like the social cost of carbon to constrain the emissions of 
GHGs that harm public natural resources. This result seems compelled by the text 
of the ERA and the trustee’s duty of prudence as found by the Court in PEDF.229 
While the social cost of carbon is based on the marginal cost of greenhouse gas 
emissions based on global damages, the ERA relates to the public natural resources 
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The most relevant public natural resource, 
a stable climate not disrupted by human GHG pollution, is both a global resource 
and a Pennsylvania public resource. If a cost is put on GHG emissions, as contem-
plated by the derivation of the social cost of carbon, parties will implement all con-
trol measures that cost less than the social cost of carbon, so that the social cost of 
carbon represents the cost that should be imposed to prevent “unreasonable degra-
dation of natural resources.”230 A lower cost will be insufficient to conserve the 
global resource, and if the global climate is disrupted, Pennsylvania’s climate will 
be equally disrupted.231 Because GHGs are global pollutants, if Pennsylvania does 
not implement all measures costing less than the social cost of carbon, but instead 
uses some lesser value based on the damage within Pennsylvania itself, the global 
climate will be disrupted, and Pennsylvania trust resources will neither be con-
served nor maintained. 
There is a second legal reason for employing a measure based on the marginal 
global cost associated with a ton of GHGs. The UNFCCC requires that developed 
 227. See supra Section III.A. 
 228. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 958 (Pa. 2013) (plurality); Pa. Envtl. Def. 
Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 933 (Pa. 2017). 
 229. See PEDF, 161 A.3d at 932 (citation omitted); see also id. at 938 (invalidating transfer of 
funds because it violated the duty of prudence and the duty to use trust assets in accordance with the 
trust purposes). Whether the Commonwealth’s failure as a trustee to preserve the corpus of the trust 
resources after damage may have created liability for damage is beyond the scope of this article. 
 230. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 953 (quoting Mont. Envt’l Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Qual-
ity, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249 (1999)). 
 231. An argument premised on the proposition that one should ignore the global marginal cost of 
the emissions of a ton of GHGs in calculating the social cost of carbon would be the equivalent of argu-
ing that one should ignore global demand and cost considerations in valuing the price of oil.  
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nations implement policies and measures to deal with climate change that “should 
be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”232 In 
this case, the “global benefits” are the avoided global damages measured by the so-
cial cost of carbon. For this reason, the social cost of carbon appears to be the best 
measure to determine both the value of the undisrupted climate resources and the 
scope of measures required under the ERA to prevent unreasonable degradation of 
those resources. 
2.  Support for a Meaningful Price on GHG Emissions 
The APCA authorizes the EQB to adopt a regulation putting a price on GHG 
emissions commensurate with the social cost of carbon and establishing a descend-
ing cap that achieves carbon neutrality by mid-century. The PEDF decision pro-
vides additional support for such a regulation through two overlapping rationales. 
First, there is a significant argument that allowing private parties to emit GHGs is 
the equivalent of allowing them to appropriate ecosystem services for free even 
though the Commonwealth has a fiduciary duty to assure that the beneficiaries of 
the trust obtain a fair price. Allowing the use of these resources without requiring 
payment would arguably loot public trust resources in an even more egregious way 
that the General Assembly’s looting in PEDF. Second, putting a price on emissions 
commensurate with the social cost of carbon and establishing a descending cap that 
achieves carbon neutrality by mid-century is necessary to sufficiently maintain and 
conserve the ERA trust resources.233 Both rationales would support either the im-
position of a fee or capping emissions and auctioning allowances with a reserve 
price that is adequate both to (1) assure the conservation of the trust resources by 
limiting the risk to those resources and (2) compensate the Commonwealth for the 
damage to public resources that will occur. In either case, the required price would 
be at least as great as the social cost of carbon, which, as discussed above, is based 
on the marginal cost of the future damage avoided by each ton of carbon dioxide 
emitted.234 
Putting a price on carbon consistent with the social cost of carbon under each 
of the foregoing rationales is arguably mandated by the fiduciary duties cited by 
the Court in PEDF. These duties include the duty of prudence, which “requires a 
trustee to ‘exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exer-
cise in dealing with his own property.’”235 A prudent trustee would seek to use an 
 232. UNFCCC, supra note 191, art. 3, § 3. 
 233. Because, as discussed above, the social cost of carbon should be set at a level reflecting the 
damages avoided by not emitting an additional ton of carbon dioxide, with a premium reflecting the risk 
of catastrophic results and uncertainty, emissions will be avoided as long as the value from emitting the 
carbon dioxide is greater than the damage with the risk premium. 
 234. See EPA SCC FACT SHEET, supra note 217, at 1. 
 235. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 932 (quoting In re Mendenhall, 398 A.2d 951, 953 (Pa. 1979) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174).); see also id. at 938.  
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effective means of protecting the trust corpus; the effectiveness of a carbon price 
for this purpose is supported by both theory and experience. Putting this price on 
carbon emissions is also consistent with the text of the ERA, which directs the 
Commonwealth, as trustee, to “conserve and maintain” the trust corpus in further-
ance of the people’s enumerated rights. Requiring polluters to purchase at auction 
their right to pollute the air, subject to a reserve price equal to the avoided damage 
as represented by the social cost of carbon, is more consistent with the Common-
wealth’s duties as a trustee for its natural resources than allowing those polluters to 
appropriate those public resources free of charge and, as a result, deplete or damage 
the corpus of the trust. 
V.  A REGULATORY STRUCTURE AUTHORIZED BY EXISTING LAW CAN 
ACHIEVE CARBON NEUTRALITY BY MID-CENTURY AND IMPOSE THE 
SOCIAL COST OF CARBON ON GHG EMISSIONS 
As suggested by Funk v. Wolf,236 individuals adversely affected by climate dis-
ruption could assert their right under Article I, § 27 to have the Commonwealth 
perform its duty as a trustee to prevent climate disruption by submitting a petition 
to the EQB seeking the promulgation of specific regulations limiting GHG emis-
sions pursuant to the APCA.237 The petition must include a proposed regulation or 
regulatory structure consistent with existing statutory authority.238 That authority 
would need to support a court order compelling the regulation’s adoption should 
the EQB fail to act, and withstand judicial review if the regulation were adopted by 
the EQB. To accomplish this, the structure should satisfy the following criteria: 
• First, as discussed above, the regulatory structure should result in the 
reduction of emissions sufficient to achieve net carbon neutrality by 
the second half of the century, if not earlier. 
• Second, as also discussed above, the regulatory structure should ei-
ther impose a cost on emissions equal to the social cost of carbon or 
require all emissions reduction measures less than that cost. The 
structure could start with a lower cost that grows steadily over time, 
creating consistency with other programs, generating a predictable 
framework for investment decisions and facilitating a transition from 
free emissions to emissions that incur a cost. 
• Third, as also discussed above, the structure should generate income 
for the beneficiaries of the trust without impairing the trust’s princi-
pal. 
 236. Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 243 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d without opinion 158 A.3d 642 
(Pa. 2017). 
 237. 35 PA. CODE §§ 4001-4015 (2011). 
 238. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 23.1(a)(2)(i), 2(2) (2011).  
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• Fourth, as discussed below, the regulatory structure should result in 
actual emissions reductions and not result in the transfer of emis-
sions to other unregulated economic sectors, states or nations 
through the process of leakage. 
• Finally, as suggested in Funk, the regulatory structure should be au-
thorized by existing law, or it should be authorized by law that can 
be implemented administratively without further legislation.239 
For the reasons discussed below, other measures may be warranted to reduce 
the cost and effectiveness of a program. However, these criteria support and argu-
ably require the adoption of an economy-wide cap-and-trade program with an auc-
tion and reserve price, similar to the program established under the California 
Global Warming Solutions Act.240 The regulation should prevent intersectoral 
“leakage” as well as leakage to other states and nations. The requirements of the 
ERA support distribution of the tradable allowances through an auction with a re-
serve price set at the social cost of carbon, except in instances where the award of 
free allowances or low-cost allowances may be warranted to prevent leakage. The 
program should be designed to effectively prevent leakage and inefficiencies by 
allowing interstate and international trading with jurisdictions with similar pro-
grams. 
Existing Pennsylvania statutes authorize both the regulation of GHG emis-
sions and participation in regional cap-and-trade programs, such as the nine-state 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) or the California-Quebec-Ontario 
trading program. “RGGI is a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector.”
241 
New Jersey is preparing to rejoin RGGI and Virginia has proposed regulations that 
 239. See Funk, 144 A.3d at 250 (noting that “[b]ecause the ERA does not authorize Respondents 
to disturb the legislative scheme, we must assess whether the actions requested are otherwise made 
mandatory by the climate change legislative scheme.”). This assumes that the General Assembly re-
mains unwilling to enact new legislation and that it will be necessary to induce or judicially compel ad-
ministrative action. The State of New York has been proceeding to implement its program for reducing 
GHGs administratively, using executive authority. See Thrun v. Cuomo, 976 N.Y.S.2d 320, 323 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2013) (dismissing claims against New York Governor’s climate change action on jurisdiction-
al grounds, limiting claims to challenges to regulations); Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 
F. Supp. 3d 554, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), appeal filed (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) (quoting CES Order, app. E, 
at 1). 
 240. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (West 2006); CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 
17, §§ 95801-96022 (2018). These regulations were changed in 2016 to set more aggressive targets. We 
are suggesting that the basic structure of the regulatory program — economy wide applicability with an 
auction and reserve price — should be adopted by Pennsylvania, not necessarily the goals.  Pennsylva-
nia goals should be structured to provide a longer term and certain path to carbon neutrality by the 
2050s. 
 241. THE REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 
2018).  
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would allow trading with RGGI states.242 The RGGI program has put a descend-
ing cap on GHG emissions from the power sector, provides for trading of allow-
ances, and distributes the bulk of allowances through an auction with a reserve 
price.243 The California-Quebec-Ontario program creates an economy-wide cap-
and-trade program that covers all major GHG emission sources and further re-
quires that distributors of fossil fuels and electricity importers surrender allowances 
equal to the emissions created by combustion of the fuels or generation of the im-
ported electricity.244 That program also distributes many allowances by auction 
with a reserve price.245 If a rulemaking petition that would facilitate trading in 
these programs were presented to the EQB, the EQB would have a judicially en-
forceable constitutional duty to adopt that regulation. As discussed above, such a 
petition would rely on existing Pennsylvania authority and would describe a rea-
sonably specific rule, thus overcoming the obstacles to mandamus that existed in 
Funk. 
A.  An Effective Regulatory Program Will Require Economy-Wide Coverage 
Under a Cap-and-Trade Program with Additional Measures to Prevent Leakage 
Many legal models would achieve GHG emissions reduction using existing 
Pennsylvania law. These include a cap-and-trade program with a variety of mecha-
nisms to distribute allowances, an emissions tax, and traditional regulatory tech-
niques (such as technology-based emissions standards and permits that establish 
limits based on technology or other criteria). Not all of these mechanisms are au-
thorized by current law. Although a mix of other authorized mechanisms can and 
should be employed as part of an effective program, as discussed below, none can 
achieve what will be required to meet the constitutional objectives without an 
economy-wide cap-and-trade program with an auction and reserve price. 
An economy-wide GHG emissions tax set at the social cost of carbon and 
coupled with the leakage prevention measures discussed below could equally satisfy 
the constitutional prerequisites. However, a tax requires additional legislative ac-
tion. By contrast, as also discussed below, a cap-and-trade program with an auction 
 242. 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-140. Regulation for Emissions Trading Programs (adding 9VAC5-
140-6010 through 9VAC5-140-6430), 34 Va. Reg. Regs. 924-59 (Jan. 8, 2018); see also Darrell Proctor, 
Virginia Moves to Join RGGI Carbon-trading Market, POWER (Nov. 15, 2017), http://
www.powermag.com/virginia-moves-to-join-rggi-carbon-trading-market/. 
 243. See Elements of RGGI, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/
program-overview-and-design/elements (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). 
 244. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: FACTS ABOUT THE 
LINKED CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS 1 (2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/
linkage_fact_sheet.pdf; CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATION INSTRUCTION GUIDANCE 
20-22 (2012), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/chapter2.pdf. 
 245. See Reserve Sale Information, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD (Mar. 16, 2017), https://
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/reservesale.htm.  
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and a reserve price can be established by regulation under the existing authority of 
the APCA and Article I, § 27 without the need for further legislation. Moreover, a 
carbon tax will not guarantee achieving carbon neutrality by mid-century.  A cap-
and-trade program with an auction and reserve price and a descending cap reaching 
carbon neutrality by mid-century would also be at least as effective in reducing 
GHG emissions as a tax, would better ensure that the mid-century goal would be 
achieved, and would also recover income for the beneficiaries of the constitutional 
trust.246 
Emissions reductions can also be achieved using traditional regulatory ap-
proaches. Typically, these approaches rely upon emissions limitations based on re-
ductions that are deemed achievable using a certain technology. This was the tech-
nique used to derive the emissions reduction goals for the Clean Power Plan.247 
Although elements of a command-and-control program (such as permits and 
emissions monitoring) will be required for any effective program, sole reliance on 
this typical regulatory approach will not achieve the constitutional objectives for a 
number of reasons.248 First, emissions limits based on what a given technology can 
achieve rather than the emissions reduction goal — i.e. the pathway necessary to 
achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century — are unrelated to the ultimate goal and 
will often fail to achieve it.249 By contrast, setting a declining cap based on the tra-
jectory deemed appropriate to achieve the emissions reduction will result in certain 
reductions. Second, the determination of a technology-based limit is based on an ex 
ante estimate of emissions reduction costs and available technologies and usually 
results in a lower degree of emissions reduction than can actually be achieved at a 
 246. A cap-and-trade program with an auction differs from a tax in one key respect. With a tax, 
the market determines the extent of emissions reductions, and with the cap-and-trade program, the 
market determines the amount of money that is recovered. The cap-and-trade program with an auction 
with a reserve price combines the two approaches and best assures emissions reductions. This is because 
a cap is often initially set too leniently and neither recovers sufficient income nor assures reductions 
that can be achieved cost-effectively. Thus, when a cap is set too leniently, the reserve price in the auc-
tion results in excess allowances not being sold, acting as a tax and achieving additional cost-effective 
reductions.  The California Court of Appeals held that California’s GHG allowance auction (which 
utilizes a reserve price) is not a tax. Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 694, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (“These twin aspects of the auction system, voluntary participation 
and purchase of a specific thing of value, preclude a finding that the auction system has the hallmarks of 
a tax.”). 
 247. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2017); see also Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,037 (proposed 
Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (proposing a repeal of the Clean Power Plan in part 
because the “rule established performance standards for coal-fired plants assuming a uniform emissions 
rate well below that which could be met by existing units through any retrofit technology of reasonable 
cost available at the time”). 
 248. See McKinstry, Peterson & Chester, supra note 192, at 10139-41 (discussing why a technolo-
gy-based approach such as that applied in the Clean Power Plan is unlikely to result in the reductions 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement). 
 249. Id. at 10140.  
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given cost.250 Third, as discussed below, it would be more difficult and perhaps 
impossible to prevent leakage251 using a technology-based regulatory approach. 
Fourth, the process of reviewing technologies and developing standards is time and 
energy intensive, and the standards are unlikely to be put in place within a time 
frame necessary to achieve the necessary reductions.252 Fifth, although technology-
based standards are intended to be technology forcing, hard caps coupled with an 
increasing reserve price would better inform the market in advance and would be 
more likely to drive the necessary capital investment. Sixth, a traditional regulato-
ry approach would not generate income for the beneficiaries of the constitutional 
trust. 
Still, regulatory approaches could be helpful to address situations where the 
market does not function efficiently.253 California employs a number of supple-
mental measures to address these situations.254 For example, as a part of its cap-
 250. In virtually all cases, emissions reductions have been achieved at a significantly lower cost 
than originally estimated. This means that a cap-and-trade program with a reserve price set at the social 
cost of carbon will likely result in more emissions reductions than might be achieved by attempting to 
determine what technologies could be employed at the social cost of carbon and establishing emissions 
limits based on those technologies. For example, in the Clean Power Plan, EPA based its determination 
of the required emissions reductions on an ex ante determination of what could be achieved by a suite of 
technologies. Analyses of the CPP concluded that allowance prices would initially be zero, meaning that 
the required “reductions” would be no greater than business as usual. McKinstry, Peterson & Chester, 
supra note 192, at 10139, n. 35; see also id. at 10140; David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic 
Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE 
L.R. 289, 318-19 (1998). 
 251. The concept of leakage is discussed in the following section. 
 252. For example, 40 C.F.R. § 60, which establishes standards of performance for new stationary 
sources of air pollutants for various industrial categories, now contains subparts A through UUUU, with 
each subpart generally addressing a different industrial category. 40 C.F.R. § 60 (2016). In the decade 
following Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA has established technology-based standards for just one category, 
new and existing power plants, 40 C.F.R. § 60, subparts TTT & UUUU, and those standards have been 
stayed and are under reconsideration. Moreover, as discussed above, the standards were outdated even 
before implementation, such that the new source standards were weaker than the emissions being 
achieved by existing combined cycle natural gas-fired plants, and the standard for existing power plants 
was no better than business as usual. McKinstry, Peterson & Chester, supra note 192, at 10139-40. 
 253. See Daniel Shawhan, Reductions and “Leakage” from US State Cap-and-Trade Programs (Sept. 
19, 2013), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/Documents/Events/Workshops%20and%20Conferences/
Shawhan-presentation.pdf; MEREDITH L. FOWLIE, MAR REGUANT, & STEPHEN P. RYAN, 
MEASURING LEAKAGE RISK 13 (2016), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/20160518/
ucb-intl-leakage.pdf. 
 254. E.g., CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA’S 2017 CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN, THE 
STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING CALIFORNIA’S 2030 GREENHOUSE GAS TARGET (2017), https://
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf. The additional measures include California’s 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS); a low carbon fuel standard; a multi-faceted mobile source strategy 
(including vehicle fleet standards, measures for encouraging the electrification of the vehicle fleet, and 
transportation and land use planning to reduce vehicle miles traveled); standards to reduce emissions of 
methane and carbon black as well as use of HFC’s; and measures to improve freight efficiency. Id. at 25, 
Table 1.  
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and-trade program, the state imposes a price on fuel based on the GHG emissions 
from its combustion by requiring fuel suppliers to acquire and surrender allowanc-
es. However, this approach will not readily produce emissions reductions if manu-
facturers do not make lower emissions vehicles available, or if suppliers do not 
make low carbon fuels available, or if homebuyers do not consider utility costs in 
deciding whether to purchase energy efficiency measures rather than granite coun-
tertops in their new homes.255 Therefore, measures like fleet emissions limits, fuel 
content requirements, and building codes requiring energy efficiency all reduce the 
cost of emissions reductions and can achieve greater emissions reductions when 
coupled with a cap-and-trade program. California includes measures such as these 
to support its cap-and-trade program.256 However, without the uniform ceiling 
created by the cap, and without the uniform price floor created by the reserve 
price, those measures alone will not achieve the emissions reductions within the 
time necessary to conserve and maintain a stable climate. 
B.  The Significance of Leakage 
Both constitutional and practical policy considerations call for the implemen-
tation of a policy program that prevents or at least minimizes the phenomenon of 
“leakage.” Leakage refers to increases in emissions in unregulated sectors or unreg-
ulated jurisdictions that are caused by the relocation of emissions-generating activi-
ty away from the regulated sector or jurisdiction.257 Leakage can occur because a 
business shifts some or all of its production to other states or nations. Leakage may 
also occur between sectors. If the result of regulation is an increase of emissions in 
other sectors, in other states, or in other nations, at least some of the damage to the 
natural resources will occur in any case. 
1.  Types of Leakage 
Interstate leakage occurs in the electricity sector, where electrons flow readily 
across state boundaries and where generation units are called upon to supply elec-
tricity to the grid in order of price.258 For example, if Pennsylvania puts a price on 
carbon but West Virginia does not, then generation units in West Virginia would 
not include an emissions price in their bids, and they would be able to submit low-
er bids. This would move the West Virginia units up in the order in which they are 
called. In some cases, this might result in a West Virginia coal-fired plant being 
 255. Although emissions reductions will ultimately occur even without the supplemental 
measures, a much higher price must be imposed without the supplemental measures. 
 256. Supra note 254, at ES16. 
 257. See Shawhan, supra note 253, at slide 5; FOWLIE ET AL., supra note 253, at 13. 
 258. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768-69 
(2016) (describing the structure of competitive, interstate electricity markets).  
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called upon before a combined cycle natural gas plant in Pennsylvania, which has 
only about 40% of the emissions of the coal-fired plant.259 In that case, even 
though Pennsylvania coal-fired plants would operate less frequently, some of the 
emissions reductions would be offset by increased emissions from coal-fired plants 
in West Virginia operating more frequently. This type of leakage can also occur in 
regulatory regimes. If Pennsylvania requires the installation and operation of car-
bon capture and sequestration control equipment on its fossil-fired plants and 
West Virginia does not, the dispatch of electricity could also shift to West Virgin-
ia. 
The EPA addressed interstate leakage of conventional air pollutants in its 
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule implementing the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor 
provision.260 The EPA based its allowance caps and state budgets on models using 
a uniform allowance price.261 In essence, this created a program imposing a uni-
form price across state boundaries to prevent leakage.262 Similar mechanisms to put 
a uniform price on emissions will be required for programs requiring GHG emis-
sions reductions in the electricity sector. 
Leakage has been a significant problem for the RGGI cap-and-trade program, 
which is limited to the electricity sector. Although the RGGI program has 
achieved significant emissions reductions in RGGI states, a portion of those reduc-
tions has caused the shifting of dispatch to higher emitting fossil fuel-fired facili-
ties in Pennsylvania and other states.263 This leakage not only limits the effective-
ness of the RGGI program to reduce overall emissions, but also depresses RGGI 
 259. The national emissions data gathered by EPA and reported in the technical support docu-
ments for the Clean Power Plan indicated that in the Eastern Interconnection coal-fired plants emitted 
1,356,066 thousand  tons of carbon dioxide while producing 1,230,444 GWh of electricity for an emis-
sion rate of 1,102 tons/GWh, while combined cycle natural gas-fired plants emitted 328,220 thousand 
tons of carbon dioxide while producing 734,335 GWh, for an emission rate of  447 tons/GW/h, or 
40.6% of the average rate for the coal-fired fleet.  ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR & 
RADIATION, CO2 EMISSION PERFORMANCE RATE AND GOAL COMPUTATION TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT FOR CPP FINAL RULE 10, Table 3 (2015), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/
files/2015-11/documents/tsd-cpp-emission-performance-rate-goal-computation.pdf. 
 260. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone 
and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (August 8, 2011) (Cross-State Air Pollution 
Rule), aff’d Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 32 (2014); U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, CROSS-STATE AIR POLLUTION RULE, 
REDUCING AIR POLLUTION PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH (2011). 
 261. See 76 Fed. Reg. 48,248-53. 
 262. In the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, EPA created state budgets based on air quality needs 
and the cost of “highly cost effective reductions,” and it imposed uniform costs to prevent leakage. The 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized the problem of leakage and approved this approach to dealing with it 
in Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. ___, at 4 (2014). 
 263. SUE WING & MAREK KOLODZIEJ, THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: 
EMISSION LEAKAGE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERSTATE BORDER ADJUSTMENTS 4 (2008), 
https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/rpp/Working%20papers/RPP_2008_03_SueWing.pdf.  
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allowance prices.264 Allowance prices are so depressed by this leakage that New 
York needed to adopt a mechanism requiring electricity distribution companies to 
buy zero emission credits (ZECs) based on the social cost of carbon in order to 
prevent the premature closure of non-emitting nuclear units.265 
Interstate and international leakage may occur in other industries, although 
not as readily as in the electricity industry. In the case of electricity generation, 
shifting dispatch of electricity units from one state to another based on price occurs 
immediately. However, products in other industries are not as readily fungible, 
and leakage may lead to the closing of a plant or moving production.266 The differ-
 264. In the RGGI program, the California cap-and-trade program and other similar programs, an 
allowance represents the right to emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide or its equivalent. See RGGI 
2017 MODEL RULE, at 4; CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 17, § 95802(8) (2018); These programs auction or oth-
erwise distribute a number of allowances equal to the cap. See Elements of RGGI, supra note 244. Each 
regulated party must surrender a number of allowances equal to its emissions (or the emissions pro-
duced by the regulated products in the case of the California program) at the end of the applicable 
compliance period. 
 265. Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 561-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), 
appeal filed (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) (quoting CES Order, app. E, at 1). 
 266. If a price is put on emissions from industries such as steel and fertilizer production in one 
state, production costs will increase in that state and a company might switch production to another 
plant in a state or nation that does not put a price on emissions. In that case, emissions will still occur, 
but in a different location. The disparity in production costs may cause a plant to close, shifting produc-
tion elsewhere. 
It is important to note that the electricity industry is fundamentally different from industries such 
as steel and fertilizer production. Electricity production must occur within a relatively limited geo-
graphic area that is tied to the consumer by the grid and is sufficiently proximate to prevent excessive 
transmission losses. For the most part, electricity cannot be stored and, although storage technologies 
are improving, they are still very limited; storage can occur for only a short period of time. Electricity 
therefore relies upon markets in which generation sources that can be turned on or off are called upon 
in the order of bids, and all electricity generators receive a price based upon the highest bid that is 
called upon. The bids are based on marginal operating costs and not on fixed or capital costs. Non-
emitting sources, such as nuclear or most renewable generation sources, do not have significant marginal 
operating costs and cannot readily be turned on or off. These non-emitting sources, therefore, submit 
zero or negative bids and rely upon the bids of fossil generators to set the price of electricity that the 
non-emitting sources receive. If electricity prices are not sufficiently high, companies will not invest 
capital necessary to expand the capacity of non-emitting generation or to keep that generation operat-
ing. The fossil sources set their bids above their net marginal operating costs, which are based on the 
cost of fuel, pollution control and other marginal costs. If a fossil generator receives an allowance based 
on its production, that allowance will produce operating revenue offsetting the operating costs, allowing 
all fossil generators to submit lower bids. Lower electricity prices will reduce the amount of non-
emitting generation by reducing the return on capital. In some cases, it may also move higher emitting 
facilities, such as coal-fired plants, up in the order of dispatch, thereby increasing emissions. For a dis-
cussion of wholesale electricity markets, see Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply 
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768-72 (2016). 
By contrast, steel and fertilizers operate in international markets and can be stored for long period 
of time in warehouses, so that the actions of a single state or even a group of states such as RGGI will 
not affect the price of a ton of steel or of fertilizer. If these industries are awarded allowances based on 
production, it will not affect price but will still create a strong incentive to reduce emissions and thereby  
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ence in industry structure may necessitate different leakage control mechanisms, as 
discussed in the next subsection. 
Finally, if emissions control requirements are imposed or an emission price is 
imposed on the electricity sector but not on other sectors, then the other sectors 
may switch from electricity use to the use of fossil fuels. For example, if a price is 
put on emissions from the electricity sector but not on the transportation sector, 
electric cars and plug-in hybrids will be more expensive compared to vehicles with 
internal combustion engines, deterring the emissions reductions that would occur 
as a result of electrification of the transportation sector. This can also occur in the 
area of building heating and cooling. If a price is put on emissions from the elec-
tricity industry but not on heating oil or natural gas, it will encourage direct use of 
fossil fuels for heat instead of non-emitting electric heating, even in buildings that 
use non-fuel mechanisms to increase heating efficiency, such as ground source geo-
thermal.267 Leakage may also affect production technology choice. For example, 
steel can be manufactured using an electric arc furnace, which uses electricity, or an 
open-hearth furnace, which uses coal. Increasing the cost of electricity emissions 
and the cost of electricity without putting a price on emissions from the electric 
hearth unit may cause leakage by shifting some production to the open-hearth 
technology. 
2.  Mechanisms to Prevent Leakage 
The regulatory mechanisms employed by California pursuant to the Global 
Warming Solutions Act reflect consideration of each of these forms of leakage. To 
prevent intersectoral leakage, California has created an economy-wide cap-and-
trade program applicable to GHG emissions from the electricity sector; emissions 
from other major air pollution sources; the import of electricity; and the sale of 
natural gas, heating oil, and gasoline.268 Interstate leakage in the electricity sector 
is controlled by requiring that importers of electricity surrender allowances equal 
to the GHG emissions resulting from the electricity generation.269 Interstate and 
international leakage from sectors vulnerable to international and interstate compe-
reduce costs. This will reduce and possibly eliminate the incentive to shift production to another state 
or country or to abandon capital by shutting a plant down. 
 267. Heat pumps are more efficient than other forms of electric heating, and ground source geo-
thermal increases the efficiency of heat pumps significantly by allowing them to discharge heat into the 
subsurface while cooling and to pull heat from the subsurface while heating. Because the subsurface 
maintains a constant temperature over the seasons, the heat pump is able to operate at maximum effi-
ciency, reducing the amount of electricity used and emissions that may be associated with that electrici-
ty. 
 268. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95101 (2018) (covered entities); see generally California Global 
Warming Solutions Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (West 2018); CAL. CODE 
REGS., tit. 17, §§ 95801-96022 (2018). 
 269. CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95101(b), 95852(b)(3) (2018).  
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tition is prevented by awarding allowances to those industries rather than requiring 
the allowances to be purchased at auction.270 
The RGGI states attempt to eliminate leakage among the participating states 
through the creation of a uniform trading program, so that generators in the nine 
states will face similar costs and cannot benefit by switching dispatch or invest-
ment to other RGGI states.271 Nevertheless, leakage has occurred as dispatch is 
switched to other nearby states that do not regulate GHG emissions or put a price 
on those emissions. For RGGI, as in Pennsylvania, it is impractical to require the 
surrender of allowances for imported electricity, as would happen in California. 
PJM Interconnection, LLC (PJM), the regional transmission organization that 
oversees the dispatch and transmission of electricity in Pennsylvania and several 
RGGI states,272 as well as New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and 
Independent System Operator New England (ISO New England), are currently 
exploring mechanisms to prevent leakage and the market distortions caused by 
some states’ failure to put an adequate price on GHG emissions. The mechanisms 
include border adjustments made by way of “carbon adders” that are placed on bids 
from fossil fuel-fired units in states without regulation or other border charges. 
NYISO commissioned a study “to explore whether and how New York State envi-
ronmental policies limiting carbon may be pursued within the existing wholesale 
market structure.”273 The NYISO study explained how, for the purpose of deciding 
the order in which generation units would be “dispatched” or called upon, border 
adjustments could assign a price or “carbon adder” that would be added to imports 
based on the generator’s emissions and the price within New York.274 Exporters 
from New York would receive a credit based on the emissions charges.275 PJM, 
which involves multiple states, has gone further and described a mechanism that 
 270. Id. § 95891. 
 271. See generally RGGI 2017 MODEL RULE. 
 272. The interconnection itself is known as the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnec-
tion. PJM includes Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Car-
olina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. 
In regions where electric utilities were restructured such that generation was deregulated (i.e. be-
came competitive), regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent service operators 
(ISOs) manage wholesale electricity transmission, deciding which generation units should be dis-
patched. In other regions, the electricity transmission and generation are handled by traditional vertical-
ly integrated utilities. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT R44783, FEDERAL POWER ACT (FPA) 
AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2017). 
 273. SAMUEL A. NEWELL ET AL., N.Y. DEP’T. OF PUB. SERV., N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 
PRICING CARBON INTO NYISO’S WHOLESALE ENERGY MARKET TO SUPPORT NEW YORK’S 
DECARBONIZATION GOALS iv (2017), https://www.energymarketers.com/Documents/Brattle_study_
carbon_pricing.pdf. 
 274. Id. at 23-26. 
 275. Id. at 24.  
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would create subregions to prevent leakage across regulated and unregulated re-
gions by way of a two-stage process.276 
Notably, the various mechanisms for limiting interstate and intersectoral leak-
age cannot operate effectively without a cap-and-trade program that imposes a uni-
form price on emissions.277 Therefore, at a minimum, an effective program will re-
quire such a cap-and-trade program with the opportunity to trade with other 
similar programs.278 
C.  Authority to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Pennsylvania Air 
Pollution Control Act 
The Commonwealth Court reasoned in the Funk decision that existing legisla-
tive authority to limit GHG emissions is a necessary basis for obtaining judicial 
relief requiring regulatory action to limit those emissions.279 The court’s decision 
was based on well-founded separation of powers concerns.280 As also noted in 
Funk, and explained in greater detail below, regulation of GHG emissions is au-
thorized under the APCA.281 This statute governs the air pollution control pro-
gram in Pennsylvania and authorizes the type of cap-and-trade program described 
above. The APCA authorizes the EQB to adopt air pollution regulations,282 and 
the EQB has rules governing the submission of petitions for rulemaking under the 
 276. PJM, ADVANCING ZERO EMISSIONS OBJECTIVES THROUGH PJM’S ENERGY MARKETS: A 
REVIEW OF CARBON-PRICING FRAMEWORKS (2017), http://pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/
special-reports/20170502-advancing-zero-emission-objectives-through-pjms-energy-markets.ashx. These 
leakage prevention mechanisms require approval by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
 277. The leakage control mechanisms rely upon a fungible price to eliminate interstate disparities 
caused by the state’s putting a price on GHG emissions. If a state relied on a more traditional regulato-
ry approach, such as establishing emissions limits, it would lack jurisdiction to impose those limits on 
other states or nations. A regulatory approach is insufficiently fungible to allow a state to impose a 
charge that equalizes the effect, particularly in light of the dormant commerce clause. U.S. CONST., art. 
I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 278. Clean Air Rule, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-442-100 (2016). The State of Washington 
Department of Ecology has adopted a Clean Air Rule, which creates a different type of program that 
requires annual percentage GHG emissions reductions and allows the use of tradeable emissions allow-
ances from other states to satisfy the emissions reduction obligation. See generally WASH. ADMIN. 
CODE § 173-442. This regulation has been suspended because of a decision partially invalidating it. 
Regardless, this approach would not be applicable to Pennsylvania because it would not generate in-
come for beneficiaries of the trust. Although it assures emissions reductions, the ability to trade under 
the program ultimately depends upon other jurisdictions creating tradable allowances with a transparent 
price. 
 279. Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 235, 248-49 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) aff’d without opinion, 158 
A.3d 642 (Pa. 2017). 
 280. Id. at 235. 
 281. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4001-4015 (2011). 
 282. Id. § 4005.  
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APCA.283 The APCA further authorizes DEP to administer air regulatory pro-
grams, including regulations adopted by the EQB.284 
The APCA provides DEP with the authority to regulate air pollution in ac-
cordance with the federal Clean Air Act.285 The APCA states that DEP “shall have 
the power and its duty shall be to [i]mplement the provisions of the Clean Air Act 
in the Commonwealth.”286 The Act further provides that the EQB “[s]hall have 
the power and its duty shall be to [a]dopt rules and regulations to implement the 
provisions of the Clean Air Act,” which “shall be consistent with the requirements 
of the Clean Air Act and the regulations adopted thereunder.”287 These provisions 
suggest that the EQB has broad authority to promulgate regulations consistent 
with the requirements of the Clean Air Act and that DEP has authority to imple-
ment the provisions of the federal Clean Air Act. 
The statute further provides that no operating permit may be issued by DEP 
unless it determines that the source will not discharge air contaminants “in viola-
tion of any performance or emission standard or other requirement” established by 
EPA or DEP.288 Further, DEP must revise any permit to incorporate applicable 
standards and regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act after issuance of 
the permit in accordance with a timeframe set forth in the statute.289 Because 
GHGs are now clearly pollutants under the Clean Air Act,290 DEP must regulate 
those gases, at least to the extent set out in the federal Clean Air Act. This includes 
control of new or modified major stationary sources emitting 75,000 tons or more 
of greenhouse gases if that source also emits other pollutants regulated under the 
Clean Air Act.291 
 283. 23 PA. CODE §§ 23.1-23.8 (2011). 
 284. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4004. 
 285. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1970). 
 286. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4004(1) (2011). 
 287. Id. § 4005(a)(8). 
 288. Id. § 4006.1(b)(2). 
 289. Id. § 4006.1(k). 
 290. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom; Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); see also Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 250, n.17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), 
aff’d without opinion, 158 A.3d 642 (Pa. 2017) 
 291. In UARG, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld EPA regulation requiring control of greenhouse 
gases emitted by sources otherwise subject to Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) review in 
quantities of at least 75,000 tons per year of carbon dioxide equivalent. Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration and Title V Permitting for Greenhouse Gases: Removal of Certain Vacated Elements, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 50,199 (Aug. 19, 2015); see also Funk, 144 A.3d at 250 n.17. 
The Clean Power Plan, which would limit GHG emissions from power plants, has been stayed 
until all legal challenges are resolved. West Virginia v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 1000, 1000 
(2016). Certain other rules limiting GHG emissions are under reconsideration by EPA. Still, these reg-
ulations remain on the books. There are many other laws and regulations limiting GHG emission under 
the Clean Air Act that remain in force and are not under reconsideration. More significantly, there are  
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The EQB’s duty to adopt regulations limiting GHG emissions goes beyond 
the minimum that may be required under the Clean Air Act, even without consid-
ering the Commonwealth’s duty as a trustee under the ERA. The APCA provides 
the EQB with the authority and the mandatory duty to: 
Adopt rules and regulations, for the prevention, control, reduction and 
abatement of air pollution, applicable throughout the Commonwealth or 
to such parts or regions or subregions thereof specifically designated in 
such regulation which shall be applicable to all air contamination sources 
regardless of whether such source is required to be under permit by this 
act.292 
Those rules and regulation may, among other things, “prohibit or regulate any 
process or source or class of processes or sources.”293 Further, the APCA authorizes 
the Department to: 
Prepare and develop a general comprehensive plan for the control and 
abatement of existing air pollution and air contamination and for the 
abatement, control and prevention of any new air pollution and air con-
tamination . . . and to submit a comprehensive plan to the [EQB] for its 
consideration and approval.294 
The APCA defines “air contaminant” to include a “gas,” which would there-
fore include greenhouse gases.295 The statute defines “air contamination” as the 
“presence in the outdoor atmosphere of an air contaminant which contributes to 
any condition of air pollution.”296 It further defines “air pollution” as: 
The presence in the outdoor atmosphere of any form of contaminant, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the discharging from stacks, chimneys, open-
ings, buildings, structures, open fires, vehicles, processes or any other 
source of any . . . gases, vapors, . . . or any other matter in such place, 
manner or concentration inimical or which may be inimical to the public 
health, safety or welfare or which is or may be injurious to human, plant 
or animal life or to property or which unreasonably interferes with the 
comfortable enjoyment of life or property.297 
substantial arguments that GHG emissions from power plants and other stationary sources must be 
regulated under section 111 of the Clean Air Act. See American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 
U.S. 410 (2011). 
 292. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4005(a)(1) (2011). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at § 4004(18) (emphasis added). 
 295. See id. § 4003 (definition of “air contaminant”). 
 296. Id. § 4003 (definition of “air contamination”). 
 297. Id. § 4003 (definition of “air pollution”).  
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The EPA endangerment finding under the Clean Air Act, the 2015 DEP report 
under the Climate Change Act, and a wide variety of other scientific studies sup-
port the conclusion that GHGs constitute air pollution.298 
Moreover, the Climate Change Act requires not only a report on greenhouse 
gas impacts every three years but also requires DEP to develop a climate change 
action plan for submission to the Governor identifying “cost-effective strategies for 
reducing and offsetting GHG emissions.”299 This provision would not make sense 
unless the APCA allowed regulation of GHGs. The fact that the plan is submitted 
to the administrative branch rather than the legislative branch suggests that the 
General Assembly contemplated that the administrative branch could implement 
those strategies through rulemaking and other actions already authorized by the 
General Assembly. Thus, DEP has authority under existing law to regulate GHGs 
through adoption of regulations by EQB, even in the absence of regulations under 
the federal Clean Air Act. 300 
Case law also supports this position. In Commonwealth, Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Co.,301 the Commonwealth Court held 
 298. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 528-530 (2007) (analysis of why 
greenhouse gases are air pollutants under the Clean Air Act). 
 299. See 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1361.3, 1361.7 (2018). Although the Act also requires the Plan to 
recommend legislative changes, this should not be read to suggest that existing law does not authorize 
comprehensive regulation. 
 300. The APCA limits the stringency of some regulations that the EQB may adopt. These limi-
tations are unlikely to apply to regulations limiting GHG emissions even assuming that they are consti-
tutional under the Court’s decisions in Robinson Twp. and PEDF. Section 4004.2 of the APCA prohibits 
regulation beyond that necessary to meet the minimum requirements of the federal Clean Air Act for 
purposes of implementing section 109 of the Clean Air Act, which relates to “criteria pollutants” gov-
erned by National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) established for GHGs. See 35 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 4004.2 (2018). That section does not apply because EPA has not established a NAAQS for 
GHGs. Even if EPA establishes a NAAQS for GHGs in the future, it must be set at a level sufficient 
to protect public health and welfare. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012). Achieving and maintaining that 
NAAQS will require emissions reductions commensurate with the social cost of carbon so that the regu-
lation described here would be consistent with that section. Further, the EQB may not establish “a 
more stringent performance or emission standard for hazardous air pollutant emissions from existing 
sources” than federal section 112 standards. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4006.6(a) (2018); see PPL Genera-
tion, LLC v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 986 A.2d 48, 50-51 (Pa. 2009). That section does 
not apply because greenhouse gases are not considered “hazardous air pollutants,” which is a narrow 
term referring to air pollutants that present “a threat of adverse human health effects.” See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7412(b)(1) (list of hazardous air pollutants that does not include greenhouse gases); Id. § 7412(b)(2) 
(criteria for revising the list, which emphasize that only pollutants which present a threat of adverse 
human health effects may be added and explicitly excludes substances added solely “due to [their] ad-
verse effects on the environment.”). 
 301. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Envtl Res. v. Pa. Power Co., 384 A.2d 273, 284-85 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1978)  
After careful consideration of the CAA, the APCA and the pertinent legislative histories 
thereto, we must agree with DER and conclude that the purpose behind the APCA and the 
provisions contained therein is to provide the people of this Commonwealth with air which 
is of a higher quality than that required by federal law.  
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that the APCA authorized regulations more stringent than federal regulations.302 
In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that Article I, § 27 au-
thorizes DEP to adopt regulations going beyond the statutory minimum in order 
to implement a statute’s legislative purposes.303 In Funk, as previously noted, the 
Commonwealth Court noted that DEP and other state respondents “acknowledge 
that the General Assembly, through the APCA, bestowed upon them a duty to 
promulgate and implement rules and regulations to reduce CO2 and GHG emis-
sions.”304 
The APCA also contains sufficient authority to extend regulations throughout 
the economy, by going “upstream” and regulating fossil fuels where it is impracti-
cal to regulate the emissions source. It is impractical to require that vehicles and 
individual homes and buildings measure emissions and surrender allowances.305 
The RGGI program and the proposed Virginia emissions trading program cover 
only certain larger electricity-generating facilities,306 whose GHG emissions are 
measured and reported under federal law307 and can therefore can be readily regu-
lated. These programs nonetheless fail to capture the majority of GHG emis-
sions308 and therefore allow intersectoral leakage. By contrast, the California-
Quebec-Ontario cap-and trade-program extends to all major air pollution emis-
sions sources where emissions can be measured, and also extends to sectors where it 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 426 A.2d 995 (1980). 
 302. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 384 A.2d at 284. 
 303. Eagle Envtl. II, L.P. v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 144 A.3d 228 (2005). 
 304. Id. at 250. 
 305. These small sources are not individually regulated under federal or state law and are not 
required individually to obtain a permit or to measure or report emissions. Regulating the millions of 
sources individually would create an undue administrative burden for both the regulators and the regu-
lated community. Indeed, EPA deemed it impractical to regulate even larger sources of GHG emissions 
that would exceed a 250 ton per year threshold and, for that reason the Supreme Court in UARG de-
fined the use of the term “pollutant” in the new source review provisions of the Clean Air Act to ex-
clude carbon dioxide. Individual homes and vehicles generally emit GHGs at lower levels and their 
individual regulation would be even less feasible. 
 306. CO2 BUDGET TRAINING PROGRAM GENERAL PROVISIONS, MODEL RULE, § XX-1.4(a), 
(REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE) 2017, https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/
Program-Review/12-19-2017/Model_Rule_2017_12_19.pdf; 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-140-10 to 5-140-
260, Regulation for Emissions Trading Programs, 9VAC5-140 (Jan. 8, 2018). 
 307. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 40 C.F.R. § 90 (2012). 
 308. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990-2016 ES-6 to ES-7 (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-01/ 
documents/2018_complete_report.pdf (In 2016, the entire electric power sector in the United States 
emitted 1,809.3 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, or 34.1 percent of the total 5,310.9 million metric 
tons of carbon dioxide emitted by all sectors (transportation, industrial, residential, commercial and 
U.S. territories in addition to the electric power sector) and 27.8 percent of the total 6,511.3 million 
metric tons of emissions when all categories of GHGs (methane, nitrous oxide, HFCs, PFCs, SF6 and 
NF3 in addition to carbon dioxide) are included).  
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is infeasible to regulate the emissions source.309 That program also requires that 
those distributing fossil fuels within the state or importing electricity or fuels ac-
quire allowances, and therefore captures the majority of GHG emissions and more 
effectively prevents leakage.310 This vastly more effective program is authorized by 
existing law in Pennsylvania. 
The APCA authorizes and gives the EQB the power and the duty to adopt 
regulations applicable to “all air contamination sources regardless of whether such 
source is required to be under permit by this act” and states that these regulations 
may “prohibit or regulate the combustion of certain fuels.”311 This authorization 
appears to encompass the broader and more effective California-Quebec-Ontario 
approach, particularly when read in light of the Commonwealth’s duty as a trustee 
under the ERA. 
There are cogent reasons for adopting the broader California-Quebec-Ontario 
approach and interpreting the APCA to support that approach. Most notably, it 
prevents leakage between sectors subject to a carbon price and those not subject to 
a price. For example, if electricity prices rise as a result of putting a price on car-
bon emissions, and if the price of GHG emissions is not reflected in the price of 
motor vehicle fuels, this may discourage the purchase and use of electric vehicles, 
resulting in increased emissions of both GHGs and conventional pollutants. If 
electricity prices increase as a result of regulations and an equivalent price is not 
reflected in the price of natural gas and home heating oil, the price disparity may 
discourage electrification of the building sector and many industries. Electrifica-
tion of these sectors will be required to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century, 
as required to conserve and maintain a stable climate. 
As noted above, interstate emissions trading with uniform pricing is one of the 
mechanisms necessary to prevent leakage. The Pennsylvania Uniform Interstate 
Air Pollution Agreements Act authorizes participation in interstate trading pro-
grams.312 That Act encourages DEP to coordinate and cooperate with “State and 
local authorities of other states affected by air sheds or regional air masses lying 
partly within another state or states, or moving between or among this State and 
another state or states.”313 This statute, along with the broad authorizations in the 
APCA to address air pollution and to implement the Clean Air Act as interpreted 
by Pennsylvania courts, appears to authorize Pennsylvania to develop and partici-
pate in interstate trading arrangements that would put a price on carbon. These 
 309. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811(a)-(h) (2012); see also CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S 
OFFICE, THE 2017-18 BUDGET: CAP-AND-TRADE 5 (2017), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/3553/
cap-and-trade-021317.pdf. 
 310. CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 309 
 311. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4005(a)(1) (1992). 
 312. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4101-4106 (1972). 
 313. Id. § 4103(a); see also id. § 4101 (making it the policy of Pennsylvania to encourage interstate 
cooperation and agreements).  
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include RGGI; the broader programs being implemented by California, Quebec, 
and Ontario; the trading-ready program being developed by Virginia;314 or a simi-
lar interstate or regional arrangement involving emissions trading or other mecha-
nisms to put a price on GHG emissions or otherwise limit those emissions.315 
Under RGGI, allowances are auctioned by each state and a portion of the auc-
tion revenue (or a portion of the allowances themselves) must be devoted to strate-
gic energy purposes.316 Although the APCA lacks specific authorization for auc-
 314. Joining or leaving RGGI is arguably an action within the purview of the governor’s execu-
tive power, even without other authority. Both the Governor of New York, in joining RGGI, and the 
Governor of New Jersey, in leaving RGGI, relied on their executive power. See, e.g., Thrun v. Cuomo, 
976 N.Y.S.2d 320, 323 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); In re Reg. Greenhouse Gas Initiative, No. A-4878-11T4 
(N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. Mar. 25, 2014) (holding that notice and comment rulemaking is required 
before withdrawing rules implementing RGGI in response to Governor Christie’s withdrawal from 
RGGI). The Governor of Virginia has issued an Executive Order directing the creation of a cap-and-
trade program for the electricity sector. Executive Directive 11 (2017), http://governor.virginia.gov/
media/9155/ed-11-reducing-carbon-dioxide-emissions-from-electric-power-facilities-and-growing-
virginias-clean-energy-economy.pdf. Pursuant to that Order, the State has published a proposed regula-
tion that mirrors the RGGI program and would allow trading even without Virginia joining RGGI. See 
9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-140. Regulation for Emissions Trading Programs (adding 9VAC5-140-6010 
through 9VAC5-140-6430), 34 Va. Reg. 924 (Jan. 8, 2018). 
 315. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4103(b) (2011). The Act imposes limitations on such agreements, 
requiring that DEP not delegate its enforcement authority to other states or agencies and limiting ap-
propriation authority and authority to pledge credit. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4105 (2011). However, 
these limitations would not prevent participation in RGGI or similar interstate trading programs, since 
these programs are premised on voluntary coordination where each state relies upon its own statutes 
and regulations and each state enforces its own requirements. 
The APCA also includes a provision authorizing the DEP to cooperate with other states and in-
terstate agencies to control and prevent air pollution, and “where appropriate formulate interstate air 
pollution control compacts or agreements for the submission thereof to the General Assembly.” 35 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 4004(24) (2011). Although this provision might be read to suggest that legislative au-
thority is necessary before Pennsylvania could join an interstate trading program and adopt any neces-
sary regulations to implement the program, it seems directed to agreements that are binding on the 
state and therefore require Congressional consent under the compacts clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 cl. 3. The trading regimes being independently implemented by states are im-
plemented through a non-binding memorandum of understanding under which each state enacts and 
enforces its own laws and regulations, and therefore likely would not require Congressional approval 
under the Compacts Clause or require legislative approval under the APCA. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 470 (1978) (holding that creation of an “active administrative 
body” without Congressional consent did not “enhance the political power of the member States in a 
way that encroaches upon the supremacy of the United States” and therefore did not violate the Com-
pacts Clause. The Court based its decision upon the following factors: (1) there were no features that, 
on their face, infringed on the supremacy of the United States; (2) the Compact did not authorize any 
of the member states to “exercise any powers they could not exercise in its absence”; (3) there was no 
“delegation of sovereign power to the Commission’ and the states retained “complete freedom to adopt 
or reject the rules and regulations of the Commission”; and (4) each state was “free to withdraw at any 
time”); NE Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985). 
 316. See Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initative, Memorandum of Understanding, ¶ G(1) (2005) (“25% of 
the allowances will be allocated for a consumer benefit or strategic energy purposes” as further defined  
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tions of emissions rights, a partial allowance auction has been implemented in 
Pennsylvania in the past, since the Title IV program under the federal Clean Air 
Act allocates some allowances by auction.317 
More significantly, the PEDF decision suggests that an auction with a reserve 
price is constitutionally required to allow the beneficiaries of the trust to benefit 
from the program. As discussed below, allowances may be considered to represent 
ecosystem services in that they represent the limited remaining ability of the at-
mosphere to absorb additional GHG pollution without disruption. Because the 
revenues would derive from efforts to preserve the environmental trust, these rev-
enues could be considered the result of the sale of renewable ecosystem services, 
similar to revenue from timber sales on state forest land. PEDF applied the law of 
trusts to invalidate a distribution of trust principal but recognized that trust in-
come from renewable services that did not deplete the trust corpus could be moved 
to the General Fund.318 The rule of prudence requires that a trustee manage a trust 
with the prudence that a reasonable person would manage his or her own affairs, 
considering the needs of beneficiaries, the need to preserve the corpus of the trust, 
and the amount and regularity of income.319 Although this rule of prudence allows 
considerable discretion in managing a trust, it does not allow the trustee to give 
away either the principal or the income with no benefit to the beneficiaries or to 
favor one beneficiary over the other. Thus, the state auctions timber, minerals and 
other renewable and non-renewable resources produced by state forests. For this 
reason, an auction of GHG emissions allowances is not only authorized but argua-
bly required in the absence of another rationale, such as preventing leakage. 
VI.  ISSUES RELATING TO POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON AWARD OF 
ALLOWANCES AND USE OF REVENUES 
PEDF restricted the General Assembly’s ability to direct lease revenues to the 
unrestricted general fund based on the Court’s conclusion that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution required the principal of the environmental trust created by the ERA 
to be retained for the purposes set forth in the Constitution.320 We have argued 
that PEDF restricts the Commonwealth’s ability to award allowances without re-
covering income for the beneficiaries.  We also have argued that the ERA both au-
thorizes an auction with a reserve price based on the social cost of carbon and re-
quires a mechanism that both limits GHG emissions to a level consistent with that 
in the paragraph), https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Design-Archive/MOU/MOU_12_
20_05.pdf. 
 317. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2012). 
 318. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 935-36 (Pa. 2017). 
 319. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007); see also Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass 
(9 Pick) 446 (1830). 
 320. See PEDF, 161 A.3d at 934.  
 
MEA102.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2019  11:27 AM 
108 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 8:1 
required to prevent climate disruption and provides reasonable income to the bene-
ficiaries of the ERA’s trust. In this section, we address the limits of these require-
ments with respect to GHG emissions allowances and proceeds from the auction or 
sale of those allowances. 
The law of trusts does not put handcuffs on a trustee. Rather, it imposes a rule 
of prudence, requiring that a trustee manage a trust with the prudence that a rea-
sonable person would manage his or her own affairs, considering the needs of bene-
ficiaries, the need to preserve the corpus, the trust, and the amount and regularity 
of income.321 Instead of being considered the proceeds from the liquidation of the 
principal of the trust, auction revenues are more properly considered to constitute 
income from measures to manage the trust corpus, much like income from sustain-
able harvest of timber. Therefore, the proceeds from these revenues can be used 
for any purpose, provided the use accrues to the benefit of the trust’s beneficiar-
ies.322 Likewise, the trustee need not receive income equal to the social cost of car-
bon in all instances regardless of the outcome, but may award allowances for a less-
er cost or even no cost where the Commonwealth, as a prudent business person, 
could conclude this would serve the best interest of the beneficiaries. For example, 
awarding allowances at a lower cost or no cost would be prudent where necessary 
to prevent leakage that would drive business from the Commonwealth without 
achieving a necessary reduction in GHG emissions. However, these situations 
should be treated as exceptions to the general rule and should be applied only as 
prudence demands. 
A.  PEDF’s Implications with Respect to Use of Revenues from  
GHG Emissions Auction 
Questions have arisen as to whether PEDF has implications with respect to 
potential mechanisms to put a price on carbon. Without additional legislation, pro-
ceeds from an auction would be deposited in the General Fund.323 If PEDF re-
stricts use of these revenues, the decision would remove a significant incentive for 
Pennsylvania to impose a price on carbon through an allowance auction. The pro-
ceeds of a carbon tax or auction could be used to promote a variety of important 
fiscal objectives.324 In addition, the current and the on-going budget crisis in Penn-
sylvania has created a very significant incentive for the General Assembly to adopt 
legislation establishing a GHG emission fee or auction and trade program or to 
 321. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007); see also Harvard Coll., 26 Mass (9 Pick) 
446. 
 322. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007); see also Harvard Coll., 26 Mass (9 
Pick) 446. 
 323. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8 (1991). 
 324. See McKinstry et al., supra note 185, at 218-21.  
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allow the EQB’s adoption of regulations establishing an auction, so as to generate 
revenue to fill the gap in the General Fund.325 
PEDF should not restrict the use of revenues from a GHG auction. The anal-
ysis of this issue differs according to how one views the auction. In this regard, 
there are two ways of looking at the auction of allowances. On one hand, one can 
view the auction of allowances as a regulatory mechanism to reduce GHG emis-
sions. On the other hand, one can view the auction of allowances as a charge for 
the sale of a public natural resource, either: (1) the air, (2) the limited capacity of 
the atmosphere to absorb GHG emissions without disrupting the climate, or (3) 
the costs that will be imposed on future generations from carbon dioxide emissions 
(i.e. “ecosystem services” — one of the natural values of the environment).326 In 
both economic and legal theory, the auction has characteristics of both a regulatory 
mechanism and a charge. However, because differing legal and political considera-
tions apply depending upon whether the fee/auction is characterized as a regulato-
ry mechanism or as a fee for ecosystem services, we will address the considerations 
applicable to each rationale separately. 
If the auction is examined through the regulatory lens, PEDF should have no 
impact on use of the revenues. An auction of allowances is simply one of several 
regulatory mechanisms to reduce emissions. In this way it is no different from a 
regulatory emission limit.  Under this lens, the auction is a mechanism that acts to 
preserve the corpus of the trust created by the ERA. Its imposition is therefore 
consistent with the trustee’s duty to preserve the corpus of the trust and there 
should be no restrictions on the use of revenues. 
Characterizing the auction/fee as purely a regulatory measure, however, has 
both legal and political disadvantages. Treating the auction as purely a regulatory 
measure under the APCA might undermine the argument for an auction with a 
meaningful reserve price. The APCA lacks specific legislative authorization for an 
auction or a reserve price, so that regulations establishing an auction and a reserve 
price without further action by the General Assembly depend to some degree upon 
 325. Mary Soderberg & Josh Shapiro, Pennsylvania In Peril: A Financial Crisis, THE WOLF 
TRANSITION (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.wolftransitionpa.com/sections/blog/pennsylvania-fiscal-
crisis. Although this source was prepared immediately after Governor Wolf’s election, the state of fi-
nances has not improved, and the budget continues to rely upon sales of assets and transfers that the 
Supreme Court in PEDF found illegal. See PA. OFFICE OF THE BUDGET, 2017-18 BUDGET IN BRIEF 
(2017), http://www.budget.pa.gov/PublicationsAndReports/CommonwealthBudget/Documents/2017-
18%20Proposed%20Budget/2017-18%20Budget%20In%20Brief%20-%20Web.pdf. 
 326. Ecosystem services have been defined as “benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These 
include provisioning services such as food and water; regulating services such as regulation of floods, 
drought, land degradation, and disease; supporting services such as soil formation and nutrient cycling; 
and cultural services such as recreational, spiritual, religious and other nonmaterial benefits,” including 
a stable climate. UNEP SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, BEST 
POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE INTEGRATION OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN 
STANDARDS, CBD Technical Series No. 73 (2012), at 14, https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/ 
cbd-ts-73-en.pdf.  
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authorization under the ERA. Treating the auction as purely a regulatory mecha-
nism may also undermine the argument that the reserve price should be set equal 
to the social cost of carbon rather than the far lower reserve prices seen in the Cali-
fornia and RGGI programs, which are lower than the marginal cost necessary to 
prevent further climate disruption. Perhaps more significantly, characterizing the 
auction as a regulatory mechanism rather than the purchase of ecosystem services 
could be less palatable to those conservatives who support climate action. The con-
servative case for a carbon fee is based on the principle that GHG emitters should 
be charged a fee for the cost of the risk of environmental or other damage that will 
arise from use of the environment/ecosystem services, rather than the notion that 
regulation should be expanded.327 
On the other hand, if one looks at the revenues from the GHG fee/auction as 
payments for ecosystem services, there is a risk that arguments will be raised that 
these revenues cannot be devoted to the General Fund to help address Pennsylva-
nia’s budget crisis but must be retained as part of the corpus of the ERA trust. Alt-
hough there is a risk that this argument may be raised, close examination of the 
PEDF decision, and the facts presented there, suggest that this argument should 
not prevail. Even if this argument prevails, it would not require retention of all 
revenues or even any revenues. 
The legislation at issue in PEDF diverted revenues that had been devoted to 
the maintenance of the corpus of the trust away from that purpose and impaired 
DCNR’s ability to maintain parks and forests, which also constitute the corpus of 
the trust.328 In contrast, the establishment of a GHG auction and generation of 
revenues would not divert any existing, similarly committed revenues away from 
the trust or impair the Commonwealth’s ability to maintain and conserve public 
natural resources. It would instead create new revenues by a mechanism that would 
also maintain and conserve the corpus of the trust. 
It should be noted that, even if the fee/auction is viewed as both a regulatory 
mechanism and the sale of a natural resource, the trustee should be entitled to dis-
tribute income to the beneficiaries as long as the revenue does not deplete or im-
pair the trust corpus. In PEDF, the Commonwealth was selling non-renewable re-
sources and depleting the corpus of the trust, which should not be depleted.329 A 
GHG auction preserves the capital and produces the equivalent of dividend in-
come. Since the application of the income will benefit the beneficiaries, that in-
 327. See, e.g., Marc Gunther, Climate Converts: The Conservatives Who Are Switching Sides on 
Warming, YALEENVIRONMENT360 (Mar. 30, 2017), http://e360.yale.edu/features/climate-converts-the-
conservatives-who-are-switching-sides-on-climate-change; Jerry Taylor, The Conservative Case for a Car-
bon Tax, NISKANEN CTR. (Mar. 23, 2015), https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/03/The-Conservative-Case-for-a-Carbon-Tax1.pdf; Bob Litterman, What is the Right Price 
for Carbon Emissions, 36 REGULATION 38 (2013), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/
regulation/2013/6/regulation-v36n2-1-1.pdf. 
 328. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 937-39 (Pa. 2017). 
 329. Id.  
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come could go to the General Fund. In fact, because the social cost of carbon is set 
at the marginal cost/value of avoided future damage to trust resources, all revenues 
equal to the social cost of carbon come from measures to preserve the trust princi-
pal and can be considered income. As long as the principal is maintained, and in-
come is provided for the benefit of the beneficiaries, the rule of prudence should be 
satisfied. 
B.  PEDF’s Implications with Respect to Award of Allowances 
We argue that allowances, as attributes of the environmental trust, should 
generally be auctioned, just as other sustainable products of the environmental 
trust should be auctioned. We also argue that the auction should include a reserve 
price based on the social cost of carbon to assure that the measures undertaken in 
response to the cap-and-trade program will include the measures necessary to pre-
vent human-caused climate disruption. This does not require an ironclad rule. Un-
der the rule of prudence applicable to trustees, certain exceptions may be appropri-
ate to prevent or moderate leakage, while still preserving the corpus of the trust 
and producing a stream of income to the trust’s beneficiaries.330 
First, under the rule of prudence, in order to prevent leakage, Pennsylvania 
could allow distribution of allowances free of charge or at a reduced rate to indus-
tries subject to international or interstate competition where necessary to preserve 
those industries’ international markets. Because the allowances will have a value 
equal to or greater than the reserve price in the auction, these industries will still 
have strong incentive to reduce emissions and rely on electricity rather than fossil 
fuels. However, they will be able to price their products competitively and they 
will no longer have an incentive to move their operations to a state or nation with-
out regulation where those operations would result in leakage. This approach will 
need to be employed cautiously, so as to avoid perverse results.331 
Second, it may be appropriate to provide for a lower reserve price initially if 
warranted to assure adequate long-term income. The RGGI and California-
Quebec-Ontario programs all include significantly lower auction minimum reserve 
 330. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007); see also Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 
Mass (9 Pick) 446 (1830). 
 331. For example, as discussed supra note 265, in industries outside the electricity sector with 
international markets (such as steel), it may be worthwhile to award free or reduced cost allowances 
based on the prior year’s unit production, with the number of free allowances per unit of production 
decreasing over time. That approach would have perverse results, however, if it were applied to the 
electricity sector, since it would encourage production even where that production would increase over-
all emissions. In the electricity sector, an allowance would represent income and, if tied to production, 
would allow a lower bid, removing the incentive to switch dispatch away from units with higher emis-
sions. Therefore, industry structure should be carefully assessed and exceptions to the general rule al-
lowed only where strictly warranted.  
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prices,332 as well as cost containment reserves that provide for the release of addi-
tional allowances if allowance prices exceed a value significantly lower than the so-
cial cost of carbon.333 The proposed Virginia program closely follows RGGI.334 If 
the Pennsylvania reserve price is set too high and trading is allowed, this may re-
duce the number of allowances that buyers will purchase from Pennsylvania, signif-
icantly depleting the income to be received by the trust beneficiaries. Therefore, 
Pennsylvania could initially establish a reserve price more consistent with Califor-
nia’s reserve price. All of the other state trading programs call for reductions in the 
caps, increases in the reserve prices, and increases in the triggers for releasing cost 
containment reserves, such that the prices will approach the social price of car-
bon.335 Moreover, because the social cost of carbon increases significantly if action 
imposing an adequate price on emissions is delayed;336 accepting a lower price to-
day will mean that the price to be paid eventually will be higher.337 Thus, the rule 
of prudence provides the Commonwealth with flexibility. 
VII.  BLOCKING ACTION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PREVENTING 
IMPLEMENTATION OF GHG REGULATION 
Perhaps the clearest implication of the PEDF and Robinson Township decisions 
is that Article I, § 27 may be relied upon to invalidate actions by the General As-
sembly aimed at blocking the implementation of regulations establishing meaning-
 332. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95911(c) (2017); RGGI Model Rule § XX-1.2 (2017) (definition 
of “minimum reserve price”), https://rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Program-Review/12-19-2017/
Model_Rule_2017_12_19.pdf. 
 333. CAL CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95913 (2017); RGGI Model Rule §§ XX-1.2 (2017) (definition 
of “CO2 cost containment reserve allowance or CO2 CCR allowance”), XX-9.2(b), https://rggi.org/
sites/default/files/Uploads/Program-Review/12-19-2017/Model_Rule_2017_12_19.pdf. 
 334. See Regulation for Emissions Trading Programs, supra note 243. 
 335. Arguably, the RGGI and California-Quebec-Ontario reserve prices are currently too low to 
drive necessary reductions, since the social cost of carbon is based on the economically efficient margin-
al cost of the damage averted. Because the allowance prices obtained in RGGI auctions have been insuf-
ficient even to prevent existing nuclear facilities from premature closure, New York promulgated regu-
lations requiring that electricity distribution companies purchase ZECs based on the social cost of 
carbon from existing nuclear generation units to put a sufficient value on their emissions-free electrici-
ty. The New York Clean Energy Standard, upheld in Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. 
Supp. 3d 554, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), appeal filed (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) (quoting CES Order, app. E, at 
1), was designed to further New York’s policy to reduce GHG emissions by preserving existing emis-
sions free electricity provided by New York’s nuclear plants and by encouraging the development of 
additional emissions-free electricity from renewable generation sources. It was motivated, in part, by 
the announcements that the Fitzpatrick and Ginna nuclear plants would close due to financial stresses 
caused by low electricity prices created by the oversupply of natural gas from shale gas resources, as well 
as by the failure of the RGGI prices to impose sufficient costs for CO2 emissions from fossil-fired elec-
tricity generation. Id. at 562, n.5. 
 336. Daniel et al., supra note 327, at 38-39; see also Litterman, supra note 331; Litterman, Daniel 
& Wagner, supra note 218, at 43. 
 337. Increasing prices in later years, when there is a lower cap, will help maintain total revenues.  
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ful limits on GHG emissions. The General Assembly can exercise a variety of 
powers to attempt to block the adoption of regulations limiting emissions of 
GHGs and having the effect of putting a price on those emissions.338 The General 
Assembly could also seek to block those regulations through its appropriations 
power or by adopting legislation repealing the regulations and removing the EQB’s 
authority to regulate. 
Robinson Township invalidated legislation that removed powers from munici-
palities and the DEP that allowed those municipalities and the DEP to exercise 
their duties as trustees.339 PEDF’s holding makes it clear that the Commonwealth’s 
duty as a trustee applies to all types of actions, including appropriations. PEDF 
could be relied upon to invalidate the General Assembly’s action, just as the trans-
fer of funds through the budget process was invalidated in PEDF. Even the Funk 
decision recognized that the ERA could be used to invalidate legislation that im-
paired rights guaranteed by the ERA.340 
Legislation blocking a regulation required to “maintain and conserve” a stable 
climate, repealing such a regulation, replacing a regulation with a weaker version 
that did not maintain and conserve a stable climate, or removing the power to 
regulate GHGs from the EQB would all likely be unconstitutional violations of the 
ERA under the reasoning in PEDF and Robinson Township. 
CONCLUSION 
The precise contours of Article I, § 27 rights, enunciated in Robinson Township 
and PEDF, as they relate to GHG regulation and emissions pricing have not been 
litigated. Nevertheless, those opinions provide substantial support both for mean-
ingful regulation of GHG emissions by Pennsylvania and for a regulated emissions 
 338. For example, the General Assembly might adopt legislation such as the Pennsylvania 
Greenhouse Gas Regulation Implementation Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1362.1-1362.4 (2014), where 
the General Assembly required legislative review of Pennsylvania’s submission of its implementation 
plan for the Clean Power Plan.  Unless the Act is construed to make it constitutional, it provides a pos-
sible mechanism for an unconstitutional one-house veto of the plan. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating 
that Pennsylvania’s natural resources are a public trust), art. IV, §§ 9, 15 (requiring passage of laws, 
resolutions and votes by both houses and presentment to the governor); Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 
516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d. 775 (1987) (invalidating legislative veto); MCT Transp., Inc. v. Phila. Parking 
Auth., 60 A.3d 899 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (holding that approval of a rule under a similar procedure 
did not constitute valid legislative action consistent with separation of powers principles and specifically 
disapproving of the process as a one-house veto). The General Assembly might also attempt to invali-
date a regulation pursuant to the process prescribed in the Regulatory Review Act, 71 PA. CONS. 
STAT.§§ 745.1–745.15 (1982). 
 339. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 977-85 (Pa. 2013). 
 340. Funk cited Cmty. Coll. of Delaware Cty. v. Fox, 20 Pa. Commw. 335, 342 A.2d 468, 473 
(1975) for the proposition that the ERA “could operate only to limit such powers as had been expressly dele-
gated by proper enabling legislation.” Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 249 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d with-
out opinion, 158 A.3d 642 (Pa. 2017) (emphasis in Funk).  
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price sufficient to put the Commonwealth on a path to deep decarbonization and 
economic modernization. 
If these decisions are extended to support an Article I, § 27 mandate to regu-
late GHGs as suggested here, that extension can also have national and interna-
tional significance. Many states and nations have similar provisions in their consti-
tutions or public trust doctrines, and the scholarly constitutional jurisprudence of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may be persuasive to these other jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
